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Abstract
This Note argues that a near-complete ban in ivory trade not only raises difficult domestic
legal issues, but also does little to stop elephant poaching in Africa. Further, enacting a similar
ban in China is not only unrealistic, but also would increase the illegal trade and, therefore, the
slaughter of elephants in Africa. Part I explains the history of illegal ivory trade and describes the
current legal environments in the United States and China. Part II presents the domestic legal and
policy implications of an ivory ban, and analyzes the potential difficulties with implementing a
similar ban in China. Part III argues that while the United States should stringently regulate the
domestic ivory market, a near-complete ban is unreasonable. Further, a similar ban in China is not
a practical solution; Chinese officials must consider strategies to optimize existing laws and gain
public support.
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“We should remember that the ultimate objective is to stop 
elephant killing for ivory, not killing ivory trade. The anti-trade 
movement seems to have lost sight of that fact . . . .”  
 –Daniel Stiles1   
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2014, newspapers and commentators broadcasted 
the news: the United States is banning ivory sales.2 The US Fish and 
Wildlife Service, in a Director’s Order, imposed a moratorium on the 
importation of all ivory with limited exceptions for non-commercial 
use.3 The agency further promises to restrict exports and domestic 
trade in the future, thereby enacting a near-complete ban on ivory 
trade.4 Environmental groups are thrilled to see the United States take 
a stand against “loopholes” that create a cover for the illegal ivory 
trade, which in turn promote poaching.5 Yet, what is seen as a 
triumph for many conservationists is causing panic among other 
interest groups, creating some unlikely bedfellows: politicians, gun 
enthusiasts, art collectors, antique dealers, museum directors, and 
                                                            
1. Daniel Stiles, CITES-Approved Ivory Sales and Elephant Poaching, 45 PACHYDERM 
150, 152 (2008) [hereinafter CITES-Approved]. 
2. See, e.g., Banning Ivory Sales in America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at A22 (“[I]f 
rigorously enforced, the new rules should help slow the killings in Africa.”); Bryan Christy, 
United States Tightens the Noose on the Ivory Trade, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 12, 2014 
[hereinafter US Tightens the Noose], http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/14021
1-united-states-rules-wildlife-trafficking-ivory-science/ (discussing the policy implications of 
the ban on commercial ivory imports).  
3. See US Dep’t of Interior, Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1 (May 15, 2014), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/a1do210.pdf (declaring the new agency policy for 
imports of ivory).  
4.  See Press Release, US Dep’t of Interior, Interior Announces Ban on Commercial 
Trade of Ivory as Part of Overall Effort to Combat Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking (Feb. 11, 
2014) [hereinafter Interior Announces Ban], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/press
releases/interior-announces-ban-on-commercial-trade-of-ivory-as-part-of-overall-effort-to-
combat-poaching-wildlife-trafficking.cfm (releasing a press statement about the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service).  
5. See, e.g., John F. Calvelli, Letter to the Editor, Limiting Ivory, Saving Elephants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2014, at A26 (responding to Tom Mashberg, Limits on Ivory Sales, Meant to 
Protect Elephants, Set off Wide Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, at A15); Ginette 
Hemley, Letter to the Editor, Limiting Ivory, Saving Elephants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2014, at 
A26 (“There are too many loopholes in the existing system . . . . By limiting ivory sales, the 
United States is sending an unequivocal message that it will not tolerate the senseless slaughter 
of wildlife and the global criminal syndicates it supports.”). 
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musicians.6 Anxious about the future of the legal ivory trade and 
furious that they are being punished for owning antique items that 
they legally purchased or inherited, some owners and businesses are 
challenging the government’s premise that banning the trade of legal 
ivory will stop the illegal poaching and trade of African elephants.7 
On the other side of the world, China, a country accused of 
harboring the largest illegal ivory trade, has taken few steps to combat 
the ivory black market.8 The United States, other governments, and 
non-state actors are pressuring China to take similar actions as the 
United States to implement a complete ban on ivory trade.9 Despite 
the fact that in 2014 the Chinese government crushed six tons of 
confiscated illegal ivory (a small portion of its illegal stockpile) and 
in 2015 imposed an import moratorium on ivory carvings, China has 
enacted no new domestic regulations or legislation on this matter.10 
                                                            
6. See, e.g., Nick Wing, The NRA is Quietly Fighting for Your Right to Kill Elephants for 
their Ivory, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 12, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/12/
nra-ivory-elephant-hunting_n_5671332.html (reporting on the National Rifle Association 
(NRA) and Senator Lamar Alexander’s opposition to the FWS’s actions); Tom Mashberg, 
supra note 5, at A15 (considering the impact of the ban on ivory imports and restriction of 
domestic trade on antique dealers and musicians). 
7. See Wing, supra note 6; Mashberg, supra note 5, at A15 (discussing opposition to the 
near-complete ban).  
8. See John Brinkley, China’s Temporary Ivory Import Ban Will Have Zero Effect on 
African Elephant Conservation, FORBES, Mar. 23, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
johnbrinkley/2015/03/23/chinas-temporary-ivory-import-ban-will-have-zero-effect-on-african-
elephant-conservation/ (comparing the recent Chinese ivory import moratorium to the author’s 
daughter’s promise to not eat chocolate candy during lent, but allowing herself chocolate ice 
cream, cake, and milkshakes); Prince William Meets Elephant on Final Day of China, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2015, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/04/world/asia/ap-as-china-britain-royal-visit.html 
(speculating that despite the Chinese import ban on ivory, the “thriving black market” will 
likely continue).  
9. See The Escalating International Wildlife Trafficking Crisis: Ecological, Economic 
and National Security Issues: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr. Affairs and the 
Subcomm. on E. Asian and Pac. Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 6 
(2014) (statement of Daniel M. Ashe, Director, US Fish & Wildlife Serv., US Dep’t of 
Interior) [hereinafter Ashe Testimony May 21, 2014] (reporting on the Chinese role in the 
illegal ivory trade); Envtl. Investigation Agency (EIA), Vanishing Point: Criminality, 
Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania's Elephants 2 (Nov. 2014), available at http://eia-
international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Vanishing-Point-lo-res1.pdf (arguing that all trade 
in ivory should be banned, especially in China).  
10. See sources cited supra note 8 (noting the criticism of the Chinese import 
moratorium; Svati K. Narula, Crush and Burn: A History of the Global Crackdown on Ivory, 
ATLANTIC, Jan. 27, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/crush-
and-burn-a-history-of-the-global-crackdown-on-ivory/283310/ (analyzing the current elephant 
crisis and contextualizing the crushing of ivory around the world). As ivory is resistant to fire, 
ivory is “crushed” by placing it into a steel rock crusher that reduces the ivory to bits of gravel 
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Instead, Chinese officials suggest that China’s system against illegal 
ivory trade is sufficient because Chinese laws regarding ivory trade 
are stricter than many foreign countries.11 In November 2014, 
however, international news reports accused President Xi Jingping's 
entourage of smuggling illegal ivory from Tanzania aboard the 
President’s plane.12 This series of recent events begs the question: 
why is China failing to deter the illegal ivory trade even with strict 
laws?  
                                                                                                                                     
and dust. See US Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Ivory Crush: Questions & Answers (Nov. 2013), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/factsheet-ivory-crush-qa.pdf (answering 
questions on the ivory crush); Bryan Christy, Historic U.S. Ivory Crush a Call to Global 
Action: Six Tons of Seized Ivory Destroyed in Effort to Fight Global Wildlife Crime, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 16, 2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/131115-
united-states-ivory-crush-ivory-trafficking-philippines-clinton-global-initiative-world/ 
(describing the ivory crush process). The United States and seven other countries also have 
crushed illegal ivory. See Christina Russo, Belgium Crushes its Elephant Ivory as Europe 
Takes Harder Look at Wildlife Trafficking, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Apr. 9, 2014, http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/04/140409-elephant-ivory-trafficking-eu-brussels-
ifaw-ivory-crushes-world/ (showing a map of all the places and dates that “ivory crushes” have 
taken place).  
11. See Ren Pan 任晓攀 & Yangqing Jun 杨庆军, 我国首次公开销毁6.1吨查没象牙 
销毁是国际惯例 [Our Country (China) Publically Destroyed 6.1 Tons of Confiscated Ivory 
for the First Time: It is Common International Practice to Destroy Ivory], PEOPLE.CN 人民网-
人民日报, Jan. 7, 2014, http://xz.people.com.cn/n/2014/0107/c138901-20327100.html 
(arguing that China’s laws on ivory are strict). In 2013, however, the US-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue specifically addressed problems with wildlife trafficking. See Press 
Release, US Dep’t of State, US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the 
Strategic Track (July 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm (outlining the negotiations between the 
United States and China regarding certain trade protocol).  
12. Tanzania Ivory: China Officials ‘Went On Buying Spree,’ BBC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29929423?post_id=100002956556933_62535897
7572648 (accusing the Chinese delegation of smuggling ivory into China after a visit to 
Tanzania); Philippe Grangereau, Ivoire, Mon Bel Ivoire: Le Péché Africain du Président 
Chinois [Ivory, My Beautiful Ivory: The African Transgression of the Chinese President], 
LIBÉRATION, Nov. 6, 2014, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2014/11/06/ivoire-mon-bel-ivoire-
le-peche-africain-du-president-chinois_1138009 (“The diplomats from the Chinese Embassy 
are their biggest clients ‘because no one verifies the contents of diplomatic baggage.”). 
Chinese officials denied the allegations and scolded the EIA’s report as “highly irresponsible[] 
for spreading rumors and damaging China’s image without any evidence.” Dan Levin, Report 
Implicates Chinese Officials in Smuggled Tanzanian Ivory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2014, at A14 
[hereinafter Report Implicates Chinese] (quoting Dr. Meng Xianlin, Exec. Dir.-Gen., CITES 
Mgmt. Auth., China) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting on the alleged smuggling); 
中国驻布隆迪使馆：中方官员走私象牙言论“子虚乌有” [Chinese Embassy in Republic of 
Burundi: Chinese Officials’ Engagement in Smuggled Ivory "Non-Existent"], PEOPLE.CN, Nov. 
15, 2014, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/1115/c157278-26030831.html (quoting Yu 
Zhong, Chinese Ambassador, Burundi) (denying any involvement in smuggling by the 
Chinese government).   
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This Note argues that a near-complete ban in ivory trade not 
only raises difficult domestic legal issues, but also does little to stop 
elephant poaching in Africa. Further, enacting a similar ban in China 
is not only unrealistic, but also would increase the illegal trade and, 
therefore, the slaughter of elephants in Africa. Part I explains the 
history of illegal ivory trade and describes the current legal 
environments in the United States and China. Part II presents the 
domestic legal and policy implications of an ivory ban, and analyzes 
the potential difficulties with implementing a similar ban in China. 
Part III argues that while the United States should stringently regulate 
the domestic ivory market, a near-complete ban is unreasonable. 
Further, a similar ban in China is not a practical solution; Chinese 
officials must consider strategies to optimize existing laws and gain 
public support.   
I. THE DEATH OF THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT: THE DEMAND 
FOR IVORY, THE INTERNATIONAL FAILURE TO SAVE THE 
ELEPHANT, AND DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
EXPLAINED  
Enacting a ban on the ivory trade is meant to significantly reduce 
the illicit killing of elephants.13 There are two species of elephants: 
the African Elephant, loxodonta africana, and the Asian Elephant, 
elephas maximus.14 Both species provide essential ecological benefits 
to their habitats.15 The African elephant and the Asian elephant are 
                                                            
13. See USFWS Moves To Ban Commercial Elephant Ivory Trade: Questions & 
Answers, FWS [hereinafter FWS Moves to Ban], http://www.fws.gov/international/travel-and-
trade/ivory-ban-questions-and-answers.html (last visited July 1, 2015) (answering frequently 
asked questions regarding the Obama Administration’s movement toward a near-complete 
ban); Beth Allgood et al., U.S. Ivory Trade: Can A Crackdown on Trafficking Save the Last 
Titan?, 20 ANIMAL L. 27, 32 (2013) [hereinafter US Ivory Trade] (proposing a “ban on all 
commerce in ivory . . . until elephant populations are no longer threatened”).  
14. See JACQUELINE L. SCHNEIDER, SOLD INTO EXTINCTION: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN 
ENDANGERED SPECIES 98–99 (2012) (providing basic information about elephants); 
CAROLINE ARNOLD, ELEPHANT 9 (2d ed. 2013) (tracing the two species of elephants to 
ancestors such as mammoths and mastodons).  
15. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 102 (“Elephants play . . . a productive role in their 
habitats . . . . The dung left by the animals—an average of 500 pounds per animal each day—is 
rich in seeds, which are carried by birds to resow the land, enabling vegetation to re-establish. 
Additionally . . . elephant dung is . . . collected and processed into stationary paper. Sales from 
dung-based paper help to support local farmers.”); see also Brad Scriber, 100,000 Elephants 
Killed by Poachers in Just Three Years, Landmark Analysis Finds, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 
18, 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140818-elephants-africa-poach
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both endangered for a variety of reasons, including poaching.16 
Elephants are poached for food or resources, such as ivory.17 Ivory 
costs approximately US $1,000–$1,500 per pound in its raw state.18 
While many of the laws and regulations mentioned throughout this 
Note apply to both African and Asian elephants, the instant analysis 
focuses specifically on the poaching of African elephants because 
most of the illegal ivory trade involves African ivory.19 
Part I.A describes the sources of the illegal ivory trade and 
explains why poaching is rampant. Part I.B discusses the current level 
of demand for ivory in the United States and China. Part I.C examines 
the international laws regulating the ivory trade. Part I.D summarizes 
the domestic efforts of the United States and China with the common 
goal of eliminating elephant poaching and the illegal ivory trade. 
Finally, Part I.E outlines the recent steps that the United States took in 
2014 to implement a complete ban and demonstrates how the United 
States has collaborated with China in hopes that the Chinese 
government will take action to eliminate its own illegal ivory trade.  
                                                                                                                                     
ing-cites-census/ (explaining that elephants open up “forest land to create firebreaks and 
grasslands, dig[] to create water access for other animals, and leav[e] nutrients in their wake”). 
16. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 104–09 (citing loss of habitat from deforestation, 
scarce resources, range fragmentation, illegal coffee farming, oil plantations, human-animal 
conflict, and poaching as some of threats to elephant populations).   
17. See Rachel Nuwer, Closing in on Africa’s Bush Meat Trade, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 
29, 2011, 12:02 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/closing-in-on-africas-bush-
meat-trade/?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A
7%22%7D (discussing types of bush meat); Jody Rosen, Animal Traffic, N.Y. TIMES BLOG 
(Sept. 5, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/animal-trafficking-
black-market/ (featuring a photograph by Richard Barnes of an elephant foot turned into a 
footstool and discussing the illegal wildlife market, including the illegal ivory trade); see also 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 105 (stating that elephants are also hunted for leather and hair).  
18. See Daniel Stiles, Opinion: Can Elephants Survive a Continued Ivory Trade Ban?, 
Post to A Voice for Elephants, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 15, 2014 [hereinafter Ivory Trade 
Ban], http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/09/15/opinion-can-elephants-survive-a-conti
nued-ivory-trade-ban/ (replying to Christina Russo’s article on the ivory trade); Bettina 
Wassener, Destruction of Ivory By China Wins Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A4 (citing 
Dan Levin, From Elephants’ Mouths, An Illicit Trail to China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2013, at 
A1 [hereinafter From Elephants’ Mouths]).   
19. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 108 (“Most of the illegal ivory seems to come 
from African elephants . . . [however, m]ale Asian elephants continue to be hunted for their 
ivory.”). Only male Asian elephants grow tusks; therefore, their survival is dependent upon 
other factors. See id. Some evidence shows that African ivory is historically favored for its 
ability to be highly polished and not yellow with exposure to light. See Sources of Ivory, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1894, at 22 (discussing the differences between African and Asian elephant 
ivory); see also Elephants Slain for their Tusks, TIMES-DISPATCH: RICHMOND, July 5, 1908, at 
25 (“African ivory brings the highest prices in the markets. It is superior to any other in the 
size of the tusks.”).  
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A. The Illegal Ivory Trade is a Lucrative Business for Criminal 
Syndicates 
The illegal ivory trade is rooted in elephant poaching, which is 
the process by which elephants are killed in contravention of local, 
national, or international laws and regulations.20 African nations 
regulate poaching through domestic legislation that imposes heavy 
penalties on offenders.21 For example, in Botswana, elephant hunting 
is legal with a license.22 Hunting without a license can result in a fine 
of US $6,400 and ten years in prison.23 Additionally, exporting any 
part of the elephant can result in a fine of US $5,400 and ten years in 
prison.24   
Despite the existence of these laws, the level of poaching and 
rapid decline of African elephants is at “crisis” levels.25 While the 
actual quantity of African elephants remaining in the wild is unclear, 
conservationists believe that the species is at risk of extinction.26 
                                                            
20. See Poaching, HUMANE SOCIETY, http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/poaching/ 
(last visited July 1, 2015) (defining “poaching”); see also AM Lemieux, Introduction, in 
SITUATIONAL PREVENTION OF POACHING 2 (2014) (citing Robert M. Muth & John F. Bowe 
Jr., Illegal Harvest of Renewable Natural Resources in North America: Toward a Typology of 
the Motivations for Poaching, 11 Soc’y & Nat. Res. 9–24 (1998)) (explaining the basic 
definitions of poaching).  
21. See generally Center for Global Research, Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching (US 
Library of Congress Legal Report, Jan. 2013) [hereinafter Wildlife Trafficking], available at 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/wildlife-poaching/wildlife-trafficking-and-poaching.pdf 
(discussing the anti-poaching and wildlife trafficking laws of Botswana, the Central African 
Republic, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania); see also Hanibal Goitom, 
Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching: South Africa, LIBRARY OF CONG. http://www.loc.gov/law/
help/wildlife-poaching/southafrica.php (last updated June 9, 2015) (providing an in-depth 
analysis of the South African ivory trade laws).  
22. See Wildlife Trafficking, supra note 21, at 3 (citing Wildlife Conservation and 
National Parks Act of 1992, VI LAWS OF BOTSWANA, Cap. 38 § 18 (rev. ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
WCNPA]). Botswana implemented the Convention for International Trade of Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, discussed infra, through the enactment of the Wildlife 
Conservation and National Park Act of 1992. See id. (citing About Us, DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & 
NAT’L PARKS, http://www.mewt.gov.bw/DWNP/article.php?id_mnu=41 (last visited July 1, 
2015)). 
23. See id. at 5 (citing WCNPA, supra note 22, at § 19).  
24. See id. at 7 (citing WCNPA, supra note 22, at § 64).  
25. Wassener, supra note 18 (emphasizing the importance of the ivory crush in reversing 
this effect); see also Enough Project, Poachers Without Boarders: New Satellite Imaging and 
Predictive Mapping to Empower Park Rangers to Combat Ivory Traffickers in Garamba 
National Park, 5–6, 9–13 (Jan. 28, 2015), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/
PoachersWithoutBorders_28Jan2015.pdf (reviewing satellite data detailing poaching 
“incidents” in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).   
26. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Support 
for Combating Wildlife Trafficking (Aug. 4, 2014) [hereinafter US Support for Combatting 
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Because of poaching, approximately 30,000–35,000 African 
elephants are killed every year, mainly in central Africa.27  
Enforcing these laws is dangerous and expensive.28 Evidence 
reveals that the potential financial gain from poaching, “coupled with 
low risk of detection and often inadequate penalties,” attracts known 
terrorist groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), al-
Shabaab, the Xaysavang Network, and the Janjaweed.29 These groups 
use such violent and aggressive hunting methods that park rangers 
cannot protect the elephants or, in some cases, themselves.30 As a 
result, poached ivory has earned the name “Blood Ivory.”31  
                                                                                                                                     
Trafficking], available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/04/fact-sheet-
us-support-combating-wildlife-trafficking (“Today, because of the actions of poachers, species 
such as elephants . . . face the risk of significant decline or even extinction.”). The last 
comprehensive numerical survey of the population, which was conducted in 2007, estimated 
475,000–690,000 African elephants remain. See Scriber, supra note 15. The Great Elephant 
Census, an updated “continent-wide” numerical survey of the elephant population, is expected 
to be complete by mid-2015. See id. (referencing Great Elephant Census: A Paul G. Allen 
Project, PAUL G. ALLEN FAMILY FOUND., http://www.greatelephantcensus.com/the-census/ 
(last updated Mar. 13, 2014)). 
27. See International Wildlife Trafficking Threats to Conservation and National 
Security: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 133th Cong. 11 (2014) (statement of 
Kerri-Ann Jones, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Envtl. and Sci. Affairs, US 
Dep’t of State) [hereinafter Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs] (noting that 
13,000 more elephants were killed in 2012 than in 2011); Scriber, supra note 15 (citing 
George Wittemyer et al., Illegal Killing for Ivory Drives Global Decline in African Elephants, 
PNAS (2014)) (noting that the Wittemyer study found that “three-quarters of local elephant 
populations are declining”).  
28. See Kasper Agger & Jonathan Hutson, Kony’s Ivory: How Elephant Poaching in 
Congo Helps Support the Lord’s Resistance Army, THE ENOUGH PROJECT 2–4 (2013); see 
also R.B. Martin et al., Decision-Making Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for a Future 
Trade in African Elephant Ivory, Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), SC62 Doc. 46.4 Annex, 8, 14 (May 24, 2012) (calculating 
the cost of protecting the elephants as: “Total Cost = US$ A x Illegal Hunting Challenge x 
Annual Scout Salary x √(Area)- where A is a constant of 4 for savanna parks and 2 for desert 
parks, Illegal Hunting Challenge is a constant taking the values: 1 = Low, 2 = moderate, 3 = 
High, 4 = Severe; the Annual Scout Salary is expressed in US$; park Area is expressed in 
square kilometers”). 
29. See generally Agger & Hutson, supra note 28 (revealing compelling evidence that 
the LRA is poaching elephants on a large scale). See also Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 2, 9, 13 (discussing American efforts to combat the terrorists 
involved in poaching). But see Tristan McConnell, Illegal Ivory May Not be Funding African 
Terror Group, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/
11/14/globalpost-al-shabaab-africa-ivory/19020563/ (discussing author Christian Nelleman’s 
research, finding that “the whole issue of terrorists getting income from poaching is vastly 
exaggerated”).  
30. See Agger & Hutson, supra note 28, at 6–8 (citing Interview by Kasper Agger & 
Jonathan Hutson with Luis Arranz, Garamba Nat’l Park, Dem. Rep. Congo (Jan. 20, 2013)) 
(showing images of what park rangers must endure). Hunting techniques range from shooting 
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While some governments, including the Kenyan Government, 
are increasing enforcement measures, government officials from other 
countries believe that the illegal ivory trade “cannot be curtailed 
without an offensive against overseas buyers . . . .”32 Some 
conservationists argue that, like the drug trade, enforcement is simply 
a stopgap and the only way to end the illegal ivory trade is to "choke 
off demand" abroad.33 As a result, some African nations have called 
upon the international community to help save the elephants.34 
B. Demand: Two Distinct Curves 
Both the United States and China have a market for ivory.35 The 
illegal ivory market in the United States, however, is small, while the 
                                                                                                                                     
poisoned arrows or propelling grenades from the ground to using helicopters to shoot with 
riffles. See Jeffery Gettleman, Elephants Dying in Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at A1 (commenting on the methods used by poachers to kill 
elephants); Scriber, supra note 15 (noting the use of “automatic weapons in Bouba Ndjidah 
National Park in Cameroon”). Reports of vulture poisoning have also surfaced, as vultures can 
locate a carcass within thirty minutes, whereas de-tusking an elephant takes forty-five to 
seventy-five minutes. See Darcy L. Ogada, Op-Ed., The Poisoning of Africa’s Vultures, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, at A25 (discussing vulture poisoning in Africa). 
31. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 66 (statement of 
Eliot L. Engel, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs).  
32. See id. at 50 (statement of Edward R. Royce, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs) (citing President Kenyatta of Kenya). See also Martin et al., supra note 28, at 14 
(estimating that the cost of protecting ivory is beyond the means of many developing 
countries).  
33. See The Ivory Trade: Up in Smoke, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2014 [hereinafter Up In 
Smoke], http://www.economist.com/news/international/21595932-push-stop-poaching-and-
save-elephants-extinction-up-smoke (citing Peter Knights of WildAid) (“[E]nforcement is a 
losing battle.”); see also Daniel Ashe, Bad New on Poaching Must Strengthen Our Resolve to 
Protect African Elephants, US FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.fws.gov/
director/dan-ashe/index.cfm/2014/9/2/Bad-News-on-Poaching-Must-Strengthen-Our-Resolve-
to-Protect-African-Elephants (“[L]aw enforcement can only take us so far. We can't ensure the 
future of elephants unless we can reduce demand for ivory where it is popular.”).    
34. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 50 
(statement of Royce) (citing President Kenyatta’s request for help from other countries to stop 
the illegal ivory trade); Int’l Union for Conserv. of Nature (IUCN), Botswana and IUCN call 
for Global Action to Stop African Elephant Poaching, Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.iucn.org/
news_homepage/news_by_date/?13833/Botswana-and-IUCN-call-for-global-action-to-stop-
African-elephant-poaching (discussing a conference convened by President H.E. Lieutenant 
General Seretse Khama Ian Khama of Botswana to raise support from other countries, 
especially in Asia, to stop wildlife trafficking).  
35. See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 20 
(statement of Hon. Daniel M. Ashe, Dir., US Fish & Wildlife Serv., US Dep’t of Interior) 
(“Improved economic conditions in markets such as China . . . are fueling an increased 
demand for . . . elephant ivory . . . . Although the primary markets are in Asia, the United 
States continues to play a role as a consumer and transit country for illegally trade wildlife.”). 
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illegal ivory market in China accounts for most of the world’s illegal 
ivory market.36 While the demand for ivory in the United States is 
mainly for antiques, Chinese demand for ivory is based on a cultural 
and historical importance of the ivory itself.37  
1. US Demand: An Antique Collector’s Pursuit  
The United States was once a major importer of ivory, mainly as 
a result of industrialization.38 Since the invention of plastic in the 
1950s, however, demand in the United States has dwindled.39 Today, 
studies show that the US ivory market is of “minimal threat to 
elephants.”40 In fact, “[m]ost Americans are not interested in buying 
ivory.”41 One study shows that most of the US demand for ivory is for 
antiques.42  
                                                                                                                                     
See also Int’l Found. for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Bidding Against Survival: The Elephant 
Poaching Crisis and the Role of Auctions in the U.S. Market, 1 (Aug. 2014) [hereinafter 
Bidding Against Survival] (describing the United States as a “prime market”).  
36. See infra notes 40, 49 and accompanying text (describing the US and Chinese illegal 
ivory markets).  
37. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (revealing that most US consumers are 
mostly not interested in buying ivory per se, but are interested in buying antiques which may 
be made of ivory in whole or in part).  
38. See JOHN FREDERICK WALKER, IVORY’S GHOSTS: THE WHITE GOLD OF HISTORY 
AND THE FATE OF ELEPHANTS 87 (2009) [hereinafter IVORY’S GHOSTS] (noting that between 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States was a major importer of ivory, 
which was used for all types of objects); Max Fisher, An Alarming Map of the Global Ivory 
Trade that Killed 17,000 Elephants in One Year, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2013 [hereinafter 
Global Ivory Trade], http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/15/an-
alarming-map-of-the-global-ivory-trade-that-killed-17000-elephants-in-one-year/.  
39. See Elephant’s Slaughter, African Slavery and America’s Pianos, National Public 
Ratio (Aug. 18, 2014) (downloaded at http://www.npr.org/2014/08/18/338989248/elephant-
slaughter-african-slavery-and-americas-pianos) (summarizing how plastic replaced ivory for 
piano keys); Global Ivory Trade, supra note 38 (recounting the decline of the US ivory 
market).  
40.  Esmond Martin & Daniel Stiles, The USA’s Ivory Markets—How Much a Threat to 
Elephants?, 45 PACHYDERM 67, 75 (2008) [hereinafter USA's Ivory Markets] (analyzing a 
study on the US ivory market). See also Doug Bandow, Punishing Ivory Owners Rather than 
Saving Elephants: When Ideologues Take Over the Regulatory State, FORBES, Jun. 6, 2014 
[hereinafter Punishing Ivory Owners], http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2014/06/09/
punishing-ivory-owners-rather-than-saving-elephants-when-ideologues-take-over-the-regulat
ory-state/ (“[T]he size of the U.S. ivory market is a reflection of its historical size and not 
current poaching levels.”).  
41. See USA's Ivory Markets, supra note 40, at 75 (analyzing sources for US demand for 
ivory). But see infra note 42 and accompanying text (summarizing conflicting arguments about 
the effect of the US market on poaching).  
42. See USA's Ivory Markets, supra note 40, at 73, 75. Compare Bidding Against 
Survival, supra note 35, at 8 (“[W]e . . . know that the broader U.S. market helps drive illegal 
poaching”), and Beth Allgood et al., Treasured to Death: Elephants, Ivory, and the 
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The United States does have an illegal ivory market, particularly 
in cities such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York.43 Most 
of the illegal ivory is imported from East Asia.44 Officials 
occasionally find illegal ivory in antique shops.45 Most illegal ivory 
found in the United States is a result of Internet sales.46  
2. Chinese Demand: Ivory, Pure and Simple  
Ivory carving is part of Chinese culture.47 Ivory carving can be 
traced as far back as the Shang Dynasty (1600-1050 BCE) and was 
subsequently enhanced by trade on the Silk Road.48 Today, while the 
                                                                                                                                     
Resurgence of a Crisis, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 5 (2014) [hereinafter Treasured to Death] 
(arguing that CITES one-off sales revived demand for ivory in the United States), with CITES-
Approved, supra note 1, at 151 (reporting that the US ivory market has remained static at a 
scale lower than before 1990), and T. Milliken et al., ETIS Report on Traffic, CITES, CoP16 
Doc. 53.2.2 (Rev. 1), 23–24 (Mar. 3–14, 2013) (arguing that it was unlikely that CITES one-
off sales increased the demand for ivory).  
43. See USA's Ivory Markets, supra note 40, at 71–72 (identifying the largest US 
markets); Bidding Against Survival, supra note 35, at 26 (same).  
44. See USA's Ivory Markets, supra note 40, at 71–72; see also Daniel Stiles, Elephant 
Ivory Trafficking in California, USA, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 6 (2015) (reporting that most 
illegal ivory is imported from countries like China, Japan, and Thailand, with China 
“predominating”).  
45. See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 34 
(statement of Robert Dreher, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Enforcement and Nat. Res. Div., US 
Dep’t of Justice) (citing several cases of illegal ivory trafficking in the United States); Kate 
Siber, Why is the U.S. Government Crushing Six Tons of Valuable Ivory?, SMITHSONIAN.COM, 
Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/why-is-the-us-government-
crushing-six-tons-of-valuable-ivory-180947789/?no-ist (“FWS agents intercept many illegal 
imports, using x-rays to sleuth tusks hidden in wooden furniture and even finding it in plain 
sight in the windows of tony Manhattan antiques shops.”); see also U.S. Ivory Trade, supra 
note 13, at 64–67. Illegal smuggling of wildlife crimes are prosecuted under the Lacey Act 
Amendments of 1981, which prohibit interstate and foreign trade in violation of domestic and 
foreign law. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2012); see also infra Part I.D (discussing the US 
laws on ivory trade). 
46. See Global Ivory Trade, supra note 38 (citing USA's Ivory Markets, supra note 40, at 
68–69) (identifying the Internet as driving the illegal trade in the United States); see also 
Bidding Against Survival, supra note 35, at 1, 15 (estimating that LiveAuctioneers.com sells 
approximately US $13 million worth of ivory per year).  
47. See generally Carl W. Bishop, The Elephant and its Ivory in Ancient China, 41 AM. 
ORIENTAL SOC'Y 290 (1921) (analyzing the ancient origins of the Chinese ivory trade); see 
also Yufan Gao & Susan G. Clark, Elephant Ivory Trade in China: Trends and Drivers, 180 
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 23, 27 (2014) (“[T]he social value of ivory[] [is] both as 
monetary wealth and a status symbol . . . . [C]arvers and collectors cherish ivory for its cultural 
and aesthetic value as historic fine art.”).  
48. See MICHAEL SULLIVAN, THE ARTS OF CHINA 33–34 (5th ed. 2005) (explaining the 
history of ivory from a historical perspective); see also IVORY’S GHOSTS, supra note 38, at 43 
(noting the history of the ivory trade). Twenty ivory carvings were also found in the Zhejiang 
Province, dating to around 5000 BCE. See Esmond Martin & Daniel Stiles, The Ivory Markets 
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legal market for ivory is small, China’s illegal ivory market accounts 
for forty to seventy percent of the global ivory black market.49 In fact, 
the demand is so high that many conservationists say that China’s 
illegal market is “fueling poaching.”50 The Chinese government has 
made efforts to eliminate the illegal trade through its “zero tolerance 
policy against online wildlife trading” and the 2012 ban of the sale of 
endangered species in auctions.51 Yet the illegal trade continues to 
grow, with even government officials allegedly participating in the 
illegal trade.52 
                                                                                                                                     
of East Asia, SAVE THE ELEPHANTS 61 (2003) [hereinafter Markets of East Asia], available at 
http://savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2003EasftAsiaMarkets.pdf  
(explaining the history of ivory in China).  
49. See Kirsten Conrad & Brendan Moyle, The Legal Ivory Market in China: Part 2, 7 
SULINEWS (IUCN), Dec. 2013 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Market in China 2]. As a 
result of the CITES-ban period, there has been a decline in the number of skilled ivory carvers. 
Factories attempted to survive the ban by shifting to other related products, the most common 
being mammoth tusks. See id.; see also CITES et al., Elephants in the Dust: The African 
Elephant Crisis, 13 (Christian Nellemann et al. eds., 2013), available at https://cites.org/com
mon/resources/pub/Elephants_in_the_dust.pdf (“China today has the largest ivory market in 
the world, much of it carved from poached African elephant tusks.”). But see From Elephants’ 
Mouths, supra note 18, at A1 (“Legalized ivory sales have been a boon to carvers and brokers, 
who have helped fuel the demand for ever greater supplies.”).  
50. See Tanzania Ivory China Officials “Went on a Buying Spree,” BBC NEWS, Nov. 6, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29929423 (discussing the state of the ivory 
market shortly after delegates from China visited Tanzania); ETIS Report on Traffic, supra 
note 46, at 12 tbl.2 (calculating that between 2009–2011, China reported 2008 seizures of 
illegally imported ivory).   
51. Grace Ge Gabriel, Opinion: Elephants are Not Widgets, Post to A Voice for 
Elephants, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 24, 2014, http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/
09/24/opinion-elephants-are-not-widgets/ (analyzing the Chinese government’s actions in 
regards to ivory). But see Dinny McMahon, China Destroys Six Tons of Confiscated Ivory: 
Move Marks First Time Country has Crushed Ivory that Had Been Smuggled In, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 6, 2014, http://topics.wsj.com/person/M/dinny-mcmahon/7507 (reporting that online 
auctions still persist on specialty websites, where ivory is sold under pseudonyms). 
52. See Report Implicates Chinese, supra note 12, at A14 (“The Chinese government has 
been trying to prove itself a responsible state actor that is serious about abolishing corruption 
and abiding by international law. But the report[s] . . . detail[] Chinese diplomats and military 
personnel colluding with Tanzanian officials and Chinese crime syndicates to send illegal 
ivory to China.”); see also Christina Russo, Q&A: Report Alleges Governments’ Complicity in 
Tanzanian Elephant Poaching, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 8, 2014, http://news.
nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/11/141108-tanzania-ivory-smuggling-china-world-elephan
ts-animals/ (“Before a . . . visit to Tanzania by China’s President . . . Chinese buyers began 
purchasing . . . ivory, later sent to China in diplomatic bags on the presidential plane.”). The 
Chinese and Tanzanian governments deny these allegations and claim that while there are 
criminals from both countries involved in the illegal trade, the governments are not involved. 
See Report Implicates Chinese, supra note 12, at A14; Press Release, Embassy of the United 
Republic Of Tanzania, Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International 
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While conservationists disagree about the current status of the 
Chinese ivory market, conservationists agree that one of the factors 
driving the market for ivory is China’s economic growth.53 While 
foreigners and wealthy imperial officials historically drive the 
Chinese ivory market, in recent years, a growing middle class enables 
more people to buy luxury products.54 Estimates show that about 
“half of the world’s luxury spending will come from Chinese wallets 
next year.”55 Luxury goods like ivory are in high demand as status 
symbols of newly acquired wealth.56 Ivory carving is so integral to the 
Chinese culture that in 2006, ivory carving was officially dubbed part 
of China’s intangible cultural heritage.57  
China's current demand for ivory is likely the primary catalyst in 
the world for the illegal ivory trade.58 Scholars and conservationists 
have traced direct routes between Africa and China, as well as routes 
in which countries like Malaysia act as transit countries between the 
                                                                                                                                     
Cooperation on Allegations that the Government of China and Tanzania Engaged in Illegal 
Ivory Trade (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://tanzaniaembassy-us.org/?p=1167.  
53. Compare Gabriel, supra note 51 (arguing that current demand in China is a product 
of the CITES one-off sales, discussed infra, as well China's “economic reform that shifted state 
enterprises to a private economy”), with Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 28 (agreeing that the 
“booming Chinese economy” is a critical factor in the increase in Chinese demand for ivory, 
but rejecting “concentrating on a possible exogenous trigger (i.e., the CITES decision)” and, 
instead, focusing on broader cultural implications, such as the social significance of ivory).   
54. See Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 24 (“There [were] almost no ivory sale[s] in the 
domestic market, and ivory products were almost all exported through Hong Kong to the 
international market.”); Bettina Wassener, As Incomes Rise, So Does the Animal Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/business/energy-environment/20
green.html (reporting that Credit Suisse estimated the average wealth per adult in China has 
increased 400 percent since 2000).  
55. See S.N., China’s Addiction to Luxury Goods, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-explains-17 
(discussing Chinese consumer trends).   
56. See id. (“In a country that is finely attuned to social-status signals, branded goods 
and sophisticated travel are high on many people’s wish lists.”); Damian Grammaticas, 
Uncovering China’s Illegal Ivory Trade, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-26167893 (“Some think it is lucky, while for some it is a way to 
display their status. Others see it as a good investment and many give ivory as a gift or bribe to 
win favour with an official or business contact.”). 
57. See From Elephants’ Mouths, supra note 18, at A1 (noting that along with kung fu 
and acupuncture, ivory carving was added to the Cultural Heritage register); see Gao & Clark, 
supra 47, at 28 (explaining that by deeming ivory carving intangible cultural heritage, the 
industry was “guaranteed . . . substantial support from the state.”).  
58. See John Frederick Walker, Rethinking Ivory: Why Trade in Tusks Won’t Go Away, 
30 WORLD POL’Y J. 91, 93 (2013) [hereinafter Rethinking Ivory] (“China [is] widely thought 
to absorb most of the contraband ivory bleeding from Africa.”).  
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two continents.59 As a result, the increase in Chinese demand for 
ivory and growth of the illegal ivory trade is directly correlated to the 
increase in elephant poaching.60  
 C. International Obligations Have Failed to Help the Elephants  
The United States and China are signatories of the Convention 
on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (“CITES” or the “Convention”), the central international 
convention governing all wildlife trade.61 As Parties to CITES, the 
United States and China must “take appropriate measures to enforce 
the provisions of the . . . Convention and to prohibit trade in 
specimens in violation thereof.”62 This Subpart provides background 
on the text of CITES and the bi-annual Conferences of the Parties, 
demonstrates how CITES relates to the illicit ivory trade, and 
discusses the sixteenth and most recent Conference of the Parties, 
which sparked the United States’ urgency to protect African 
elephants.  
1. What is CITES?  
CITES was first conceived in 1963 through the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (the “IUCN”), the first global 
organization to promote environmental conservation and to combat 
                                                            
59. See Global Ivory Trade, supra note 38 (showing a map of the main trade routes 
between Africa and China). For a more detailed map, see T. Milliken, Illegal Trade in Ivory 
and Rhino Horn: An Assessment to Improve Law Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS 
Project, TRAFFIC, 10–11 (2014). Demand in Thailand also plays a significant role in the 
illegal ivory trade. See id. 
60. See WildAid, Ivory Demand in China 2012–2014, 2 (Zach Weismann ed., 2014), 
available at http://www.wildaid.org/sites/default/files/resources/Print_Ivory%20Report_Final_
v3.pdf (discussing the impact of the ivory trade in China on poaching); Godfrey Harris, Op-
Ed, How to Save Both Elephants and the Ivory Trade, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2014, http://www.
latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-harris-ivory-collecting-20140722-story.html (“Today's 
poaching problems has its roots in East Asia, where there is still a strong demand for and an 
active trade in new ivory objects.”).   
61. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) § IX(1)(b) (Mar. 3, 1973), 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into 
force July 1, 1975); see also List of Contracting Parties, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/
disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited July 1, 2015) (listing the Parties to the Convention). The 
United States ratified CITES on January 14, 1974, and it entered into force on July 1, 1975. 
See id. China acceded to CITES on January 8, 1981, and it entered into force April 8, 1981. 
See id.  
62. CITES, supra note 61, § VIII(1) (requiring trade restrictions on wildlife).  
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climate change.63 Entered into force on July 1, 1975, CITES promotes 
international cooperation to ensure that “international trade in 
specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their 
survival.”64 While CITES imposes obligations on the Parties, and 
certain provisions are self-enacting, these provisions only provide a 
broad framework.65 Conversely, most of the CITES provisions are not 
self-executing and countries must enact domestic legislation to fully 
implement the treaty.66 In that regard, CITES only controls 
international trade and has no control over domestic trade.67 CITES 
does require, however, that each Party designate one or more 
scientific authority and a management authority that will monitor 
wildlife trade and the status of individual species.68 The scientific and 
management authorities in the United States are divisions of the Fish 
and Wildlife Service (the “FWS”).69 In China, the management 
authority is the Endangered Import and Export Management Office of 
the People’s Republic of China (the “Chinese Management 
Authority”) and the scientific authority is the Endangered Species 
Scientific Commission of the People’s Republic of China.70 
                                                            
63. See What is CITES?, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (last visited 
July 1, 2015) (answering most commonly asked questions about CITES); About IUCN, IUCN 
http://www.iucn.org/about/ (last visited July 1, 2015). For further background on CITES, see 
Christine Fuchs, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (Cites)—Conservation Efforts Undermine the Legality Principle, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1565, 
1566 (2008) (giving a detailed analysis of CITES); Ruth A. Braun, Lions, Tigers and Bears 
(Oh My): How to Stop Endangered Species Crime, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 545, 547 (2000).  
64. What is CITES?, supra note 63 (noting that 180 countries are Parties to CITES).  
65. See id. (explaining how CITES coexists with domestic legislation); Cyrille de 
Klemm, Guidelines for Legislation to Implement CITES, IUCN ENVIR. POL'Y & L. PAPER NO. 
26, 5-8 (1993) (commenting on domestic implementation of CITES).  
66. What is CITES?, supra note 63. 
67. See James B. Murphy, Alternative Approaches to the CITES “Non-Detriment” 
Finding for Appendix II Species, 36 ENVTL. L. 531, 536 (2006) (noting that CITES does not 
affect domestic trade); Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Gatt: 
Conflict and Resolution?, 26 Envtl. L. 841, 876 (1996) (“CITES only mandates restrictions on 
international trade and not restrictions on domestic trade or consumption.”). 
68. See CITES, supra note 61, § IX(1)(b). Scientific authorities are charged with issuing 
“non-detriment” findings, whereby a specimen may only be exported or imported if in doing 
so the survival of that species will not be affected. See id.; Murphy, supra note 67, at 537–38. 
The management authority is responsible for overseeing the permitting process for imports and 
exports. See CITES, supra note 61, § IX(1)(a).    
69. CITES, US Fish & Wildlife Serv., http://www.fws.gov/international/cites/ (last 
visited July 1, 2015) (explaining the purpose and structure of the FWS); see also 16 U.S.C. § 
742b(b) (2012) (creating the FWS as a division within the Department of the Interior). 
70. See China: Management Authority, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/cms/index.php/
component/cp/country/CN (last visited July 1, 2015) (discussing the implementation of CITES 
in China); see also 21 Branch Offices of the Chinese CITES Management Authority Meet With 
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Every two to three years, all Parties to CITES meet at the 
Conference of the Parties (the “CoP”).71 The CoP, as the “supreme 
decision making body,” adopts various resolutions and decisions 
drafted by the Standing Committee and proposed by the Secretariat.72 
Another task of the CoP is to review all progress in conservation of 
wildlife, as well as consider and amend the Appendix system.73 As the 
central tenant of the CITES text, the Appendix System is a three-
category classification (Appendix I, II, and III) of wildlife species 
based on a species’ risk of extinction.74 A permit is required for all 
exports, imports, and re-exports of wildlife within one of these 
Appendices, but the ease with which an individual may obtain a 
permit depends on the Appendix in which the species is listed.75   
Appendix I is the most stringent level and is reserved for species 
near extinction.76 Appendix II is for species “not necessarily” at risk 
of extinction, but trade in the species is still regulated to ensure such a 
risk does not occur.77 The key difference between the two is that 
Appendix I involves a more rigorous process to obtain a permit. 
Further, unlike species in Appendix II, a permit is required for all 
                                                                                                                                     
the CITES Secretary-General, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/news/sundry/2013/20130802_
china_cites.php (last visited July 1, 2015) (describing how the Management Authority works 
closely with the State Forestry Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and twelve 
other agencies through China’s National Inter-Agencies CITES Enforcement Coordination 
Group).  
71. See CITES, supra note 61, § XI(2) (“[T]he Secretariat shall convene regular 
meetings at least once every two years.”); What is CITES?, supra note 63 (explaining how 
CITES and its members interact).  
72. What is CITES?, supra note 63; Conference of the Parties, CITES, 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/cop.php (last visited July 1, 2015) (describing the CoP). The 
Standing Committee provides guidance to the Secretariat regarding policy and CITES 
implementation. See Standing Committee, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/sc.php (last 
visited July 1, 2015) (explaining the functions of the Standing Committee). The Secretariat 
acts as a coordinator and is responsible for planning the meetings of the CoP, collecting reports 
from the Parties, and providing legislative and enforcement guidance when requested. See The 
CITES Secretariat, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/sec/index.php (last visited July 1, 
2015) (discussing the Secretariat’s role).  
73. See CITES, supra note 61, § XV(1)(b) (outlining the amendment process); 
Conference of the Parties, supra note 72 (same).  
74. See CITES Appendices I, II, and III (valid from 5 February 2015), CITES, 
https://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php (last visited July 1, 2015); Murphy, supra note 
67, at 536 (introducing the Appendix system).  
75. See CITES, supra note 61, § II(4) (“The Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of 
species included in Appendices I, II and III except in accordance with the . . . Convention.”). 
For the purposes of this Note, “species” shall only refer to dead specimens or parts of the dead 
specimen. CITES does, however, cover live specimens. See id. § II–IV.  
76. See id. § II(1) (presenting the trade requirements for Appendix I species).   
77. See id. § II(2) (outlining trade obligations under Appendix II).  
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imports of Appendix I specimens.78 Appendix I import permits are 
granted only in exceptional circumstances and never for commercial 
purposes.79 Appendix III, not relevant for the purposes of the African 
elephant, protects species from specific origins.80 The requirements 
under the Appendices are baselines; countries may impose more 
stringent requirements on imports and exports of any species.81 
2. CITES and African Elephants 
In 1976, the African Elephant was first listed on Appendix III by 
Ghana, but the CoP voted to designate the African elephant as 
Appendix II the following year.82 In 1989, the CoP raised the 
designation of the African elephant to Appendix I.83 Today, the 
African elephant is the only “split listing,” meaning that African 
elephants from Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, are listed on 
Appendix II, while African elephants from all other origins are listed 
on Appendix I.84 As mentioned in Part I.C.2, supra, this means that 
most elephants are at risk of extinction, but in the specific countries 
                                                            
78. See id. § III(2)(d). Under Appendix I, an import permit from another country must be 
granted before an export permit will be issued. See id.; see also Michael J. Glennon, Has 
International Law Failed the Elephant?, AM. J. INT’L LAW 1, 11 (1990), for a full explanation 
of the requirements for export/import in each Appendix. 
79. See CITES, supra note 61, § II(3) (specifying import requirements).   
80. See id. § V (characterizing Appendix III requirements); Appendices, CITES, 
http://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php (last visited July 1, 2015) (assessing trade 
requirements under CITES). For example, sea cucumbers from Ecuador are protected under 
Appendix III, but sea cucumbers from other countries are unlisted. See id. All importers of an 
Appendix III species must present a certificate of origin and, if from an origin specified in 
Appendix III, an importer must also present an export permit from that country. (e.g. an 
importer of sea cucumbers must present a certificate of origin and, if that origin is Ecuador, 
then the importer must also present an export permit from Ecuador). See id.   
81. See id. § XIV(1) (providing that countries may impose “stricter domestic measures 
regarding the conditions for trade . . . of species included in Appendices . . . .”); What is 
CITES?, supra note 63 (explaining that CITES “provides a framework to be respected by each 
Party, which has to adopt its own domestic legislation”).  
82. US Fish & Wildlife Serv., CITES & Elephants: What is the “Global Ban” on Ivory 
Trade?, 1 (2013) [hereinafter CITES & Elephants], available at http://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/
CITES-and-Elephant-Conservation.pdf (giving a brief history of elephants and CITES); see 
also U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 35–36 (providing an Appendix history of the 
elephant).  
83. See CITES & Elephants, supra note 82, at 1. 
84. ROSALEEN DUFFY, NATURE CRIME: HOW WE'RE GETTING CONSERVATION WRONG 
48 (2010) (explaining “split listing”); African Elephant, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/
gallery/species/mammal/african_elephant.html (last accessed July 1, 2015) (listing all 
elephants as Appendix I except for those in Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, 
which are listed on Appendix II).   
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mentioned, populations are such that a small, but heavily regulated 
trade is permissible.85  
Scholars note that the protection of African elephants under 
CITES has some weaknesses.86 For example, CITES gives the 
management and scientific authority of countries broad discretion to 
decide whether or not to grant a permit.87 Further, regardless of the 
Appendix status, specimens of African elephants removed from the 
wild pre-1976—i.e., if the elephant was killed before 1976—are 
exempted from CITES requirements.88 Also, African elephant hunting 
trophies are often given import or export permits, as long as they are 
for noncommercial purposes.89  
The CoP attempts to minimize the effect of existing limitations 
through various Resolutions and Decisions.90 For example, the 
Resolution Conference 10.10: Trade in African Specimens (the 
“Resolution Conf. 10.10”), one of the key resolutions regarding 
                                                            
85. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (explaining the key differences 
between Appendix I and Appendix II species). With the current levels of poaching, this “split 
listing” is highly controversial. See DUFFY, supra note 84, at 137–39 (recounting the protests 
that occurred at the time CITES adopted the “split listing” and the subsequent fracture of 
opinion that occurred, apart from that of groups like the World Wildlife Fund, a NGO and 
strong advocate against the ivory trade); Fuchs, supra note 63, at 1577–78 (presenting the 
“much contested question[:] whether or not to permit the split-listing”).  
86. See CITES & Elephants, supra note 82, at 1 (“CITES ‘ban’ on ivory trade has several 
limitations.”); Robert W.G. Jenkins, An Overview of the Fundamental Principles of CITES as 
a Mechanism for Regulating Trade in Listed Species, 1–2 (CITES Workshop on Introduction 
from the Sea Issues, Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 2005), available at https://cites.org/sites/default/files/
eng/news/meetings/IFS-05/IFS05-principle.pdf (listing some limitations of CITES).  
87. See de Klemm, supra note 65, at 25 (explaining permit requirements under CITES); 
CITES, Implementation of the Convention in individual Countries, Doc. SC.41.12, 4 (Feb. 8–
12, 1999) (expounding on the implementation of CITES through national legislation).  
88. See CITES & Elephants, supra note 82, at 1 (explaining the application of CITES). 
Import-export laws regarding pre-CITES ivory may be subject to stricter laws such as US law, 
discussed infra. 
89. See id. (“Elephant range countries issue an annual export quota for hunting trophies 
taken for non-commercial purposes.”); CITES, Permits and Certificates, Resolution Conf. 
12.3 (Rev. CoP16), 4 (June 12, 2013) (defining hunting trophy as an “animal, or readily 
recognizable part . . . [with] any accompanying CITES permit or certificate, that: (i) is raw . . . 
(ii) was legally obtained by the hunter through hunting for the hunter’s personal use; and (iii) 
is being imported, exported, or re-exported by or on behalf of the hunter . . . .”).  
90. See Fuchs, supra note 63, at 1575 (“These [R]esolutions have brought about a 
considerable reform of the Convention’s mode of work . . . . The success of the treaty . . . 
depends on its adaptation capacities.”); Jenkins, supra note 86, at 2 (emphasizing the 
importance of Resolutions and Decisions of the Parties). Resolutions provide “long-standing 
guidance” to the Parties, while Decisions are instructions to individual committees or to the 
CITES Secretariat. See Decisions of the Conference of the Parties, CITES, www.cites.org/eng/
dec/intro.php (last visited July 1, 2015).        
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African elephants, provides an international definition of raw ivory.91 
While later amended, the Resolution Conf. 10.10 also provided the 
first international definition of worked ivory.92 In addition to creating 
these definitions, the Resolution Conf. 10.10 makes recommendations 
about creating and enforcing domestic legislation and regulations to 
monitor the ivory trade.93 It further directs the Secretariat to identify 
countries not enforcing the Appendix requirements.94 Finally, the 
Resolution Conf. 10.10 provides for the assessment of trade 
restrictions against those Parties not in compliance.95 
The Resolution Conf. 10.10 also created two crucial programs: 
CITES Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (“MIKE”) and 
Elephant Trade Information System (“ETIS”).96 MIKE monitors 
eighty sites between Africa and Asia and reports to the CoP, enabling 
the Parties to make decisions about enforcement and management.97 
Specifically, MIKE monitors poaching levels and reports on factors 
                                                            
91. CITES, Draft Revision of the Resolution of Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15) on Trade in 
Elephant Specimens, CoP16 Doc. 26 (Rev. 1), 5 (Mar. 3–14 2013) [hereinafter Revision of 
10.10] (defining “raw ivory” as “all whole elephant tusks, polished, or unpolished and in any 
form whatsoever, and all elephant ivory in cut pieces, polished or unpolished and howsoever 
changed from its original form, except for ‘worked ivory.’”).   
92.  See id. The Resolution Conf. 10.10 originally defined “worked ivory” as “readily 
recognizable . . . [and includes] all items made of ivory for jewelry, adornment, art utility or 
musical instruments (but not including whole tusks in any form, except where the whole 
surface has been carved), provided that such items are clearly recognizable as such and in 
forms requiring no further carving, crafting or manufacture to effect their purpose.” Id. at 5–6 
(amending the definition to “ivory that has been carved, shaped, or processed, either fully or 
partially, but shall not include whole tusks in any form except where the whole surface has 
been carved.”).  
93. See id. at 6 (“URGES those Parties in whose jurisdiction . . . a legal domestic trade in 
ivory . . . exist[s] . . . ensure that they have put in place comprehensive international 
legislative, regulatory, [ ] enforcement and other measures.”).  
94. See id. at 7. This includes Parties with “unregulated . . . markets for ivory . . . [or] 
significant quantities of ivory . . . found to be illegally traded[,] . . . ivory stockpiles . . . not 
well secured, or . . . [have] significant levels of illegal trade in ivory.” See id.  
95. See id. (“[T]he Standing Committee . . . may consider appropriate measures . . . 
including recommendations to restrict[] . . . or suspend commercial trade in specimens of 
CITES-listed species to or from such Parties in case of failure to achieve compliance.”) 
(emphasis added).   
96. See CITES, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, CoP16 Doc. 53.1, 1 (Mar. 3–
14, 2013) [hereinafter MIKE Report] (calculating the number of incidents of poaching as a 
means of analyzing the illegal trade); ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 46, at 1 (using the 
number of reported seizures of illegally traded ivory as a means of analyzing the illegal trade).   
97. See CITES, CITES MIKE Programme, available at http://www.cites.org/common/
prog/mike/brochure.pdf (characterizing MIKE); MIKE, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/
prog/mike/intro/index.shtml (last visited July 1, 2015) (providing general background on 
MIKE). 
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that affect population levels, such as human conflict and ivory trade 
patterns.98 ETIS is similar to MIKE in its purpose, but its monitoring 
system is quite different.99 Instead of poaching, ETIS tracks seizures 
of illegally imported or exported elephant specimens, including 
ivory.100 ETIS’ main goal is to map illegal trade routes, report on 
smuggling trends, and give recommendations for enforcement 
personnel.101 While ETIS and MIKE have limitations, they provide 
important data regarding the current status of the illegal ivory trade.102  
Recently, the CoP increased efforts to reduce the illegal ivory 
trade through the Action Plan for the Control of Trade in Elephant 
Ivory (the “Control of Trade Plan”), the African Elephant Action Plan 
(the “AEAP”), and the Decision Making Mechanism for Future Trade 
in Elephant Ivory (the “DMM”).103 The Control of Trade Plan urges 
Parties to enact legislation to regulate domestic trade that would put 
the burden of proof of lawful possession upon the possessor.104 
Further, it directs the Secretariat to report countries where significant 
illegal trade pervades; recommends trade sanctions against countries 
in which there is a large illegal ivory trade; and urges countries to 
cooperate with scientific studies involving ivory recognition.105 The 
AEAP is a proposed plan based on the data collected by MIKE, ETIS, 
                                                            
98. See sources cited supra note 97 (discussing MIKE).  
99. What is ETIS?, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/etis/index.php (last visited 
July 1, 2015) (providing general background on ETIS). See also Revision of 10.10, supra note 
91, at 11 (explaining that ETIS enhanced the Bad Ivory Database System (BIDS) developed by 
the wildlife trade-monitoring network, TRAFFIC, in 1992). TRAFFIC was created by IUCN 
and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1976 and monitors the trade of wildlife 
internationally. See Traffic: the Wildlife Monitoring Trade Networks, WWF, http://www.world
wildlife.org/initiatives/traffic-the-wildlife-trade-monitoring-network (last visited July 1, 2015). 
100. CITES & Elephants, supra note 82, at 2; ETIS, supra note 99 (describing the duties 
of ETIS).  
101. See sources cited supra note 100 (providing background of ETIS).   
102. See, e.g., MIKE Report, supra note 96, at 9; ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 46, 
at 4–5 (admitting that ETIS requires that seizures actually occur (the “seizure rate”) and that 
those seizures are then reported (the “reporting rate”), and further explaining that if a country’s 
reporting rate increases, it may distort the seizure rate). Both ETIS and MIKE take steps to 
mitigate these limitations. See MIKE Report, supra note 96, at 9; ETIS Report on Traffic, 
supra note 46, at 4–5. 
103. See CITES, Proposed New Resolution Concerning the African Elephant Action 
Plan and African Elephant Fund, CoP16 Doc. 53.3 (Rev. 2), 1 (Mar. 3–14, 2013); CITES, 
Decisions of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in Effect After its 15th Meeting, 34 n.6 
(Mar. 13–25, 2010) [hereinafter Control of Trade Plan]; CITES, Proposal to Amend Decision 
14.77 on a Decision-Making Mechanism for Future Trade in Elephant Ivory, CoP16 Doc. 37 
(Rev. 1), 1 (Mar. 3–14, 2014) [hereinafter DMM]. 
104. See Control of Trade Plan, supra note 103, at 32. 
105. See id. at 35.  
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and the Secretariat to aid in the implementation of the Control of 
Trade Plan and to promote conservation programs.106 Finally, the 
DMM is a proposal to explore conditions in which a legal ivory trade 
could continue based on an independent study commissioned by the 
Secretariat.107  
The CoP, however, also has taken some controversial actions.108 
For example, the CoP allowed “one-off” sales, the most recent being 
in 2008, in which China and Japan purchased approximately 107,770 
kg of raw ivory from Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe for a collective total of nearly US$15.5 million.109 In 
exchange for allowing the 2008 one-off sale, a nine-year moratorium 
on ivory trade from these countries is currently in effect.110 
3. CoP16: All Eyes on the African Elephant 
The sixteenth Conference of the Parties ("CoP16") was held on 
March 3–14, 2013 in Bangkok, Thailand.111 The focus was the illegal 
trade of wildlife, particularly ivory.112 The MIKE and ETIS reports 
discussed at the CoP16 revealed troubling statistics with respect to the 
survival of the African Elephant. The CoP16 discussions resulted in a 
                                                            
106. See CITES, Decisions of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in Effect after the 
14th Meeting, CoP14 §§ 14.75, 14.78–.79, 20–21 (Jun. 03–15, 2007).  
107. See DMM, supra note 103, at 1.    
108. Compare David J. Hayes et al., Comments and Recommendations for the Advisory 
Council on Wildlife Trafficking, STANFORD L. POLICY LAB CLASS 413P, 15–16, Mar. 20, 
2014 (criticizing some of the Parties’ decisions as “undermining [CITES’] success in reducing 
wildlife trafficking”), with Rethinking Ivory, supra note 58, at 96–97 (pointing out that many 
of the criticisms of CITES’ controversial actions are contrary to what the raw data reveals).    
109. See ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 46, at 24.  
110. See id. at 23–24; Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 21 
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1, 2 (IISD Mar. 3, 2013), available at http://www.iisd.ca/cites/
cop16/compilatione.pdf.  
111. See Conference of the Parties, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/index.php (last 
visited July 1, 2015) (includes links to agenda, working documents, reports, and daily journals 
of the CoP); Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); Sixteenth Regular Meeting; Provisional Agenda; 
Announcement of Public Meeting, 77 Fed. Reg. 67390 (Nov. 9, 2012) (announcing the United 
States’ attendance at the CoP16 and soliciting comments on the agenda items).  
112. Sara Vinson et al., Year In Review: International Environmental Law, 48 A.B.A. 
SEC. INT’L LAW 435, 446–48 (2013); Damian Carrington, More Valuable than Gold or 
Heroin—the Illegal Trade Driving Wildlife to the Brink, GUARDIAN, Mar. 2, 2013, at 21. 
(“[O]fficials from 177 countries gather in Bangkok for the first [CITES] summit for three 
years, with major battles expected over protection for polar bears, ending ‘trophy’ hunting for 
rhinos and the free trade in ivory in the host nation, Thailand.”).  
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better understanding of the role that supply and demand economics 
play in perpetuating the illegal ivory trade, but did not produce any 
tangible plans to combat it.  
i. ETIS and MIKE  
ETIS and MIKE reports demonstrated the dire situation of 
African elephants.113 Collectively, nearly 300 tons of ivory were 
seized between 2009 and 2011, the majority of which was worked 
ivory, each piece weighing less than 10 kg per piece.114 Additionally, 
the incidents of poaching, especially in Central Africa, and the 
number of seizures of illegally imported and exported ivory have 
steadily increased since 2005.115  
While an increased seizure rate is encouraging, ETIS found that 
“almost none of the seizures . . . resulted in successful investigations 
of the criminals behind these transactions.”116 China and Thailand 
were identified as having the largest domestic ivory trade and weakest 
laws.117 China alone reported 2,008 seizures between 2009 and 
2011.118 ETIS identified Hong Kong as one of the main ports of 
transit.119 In contrast, ETIS reported that the United States’ role in the 
illegal ivory trade is de minimus.120 While the United States’ market 
score for ivory is moderate, only 200 pieces of illegal ivory were 
seized between 2009 and 2011.121 Further, ETIS found that US laws 
                                                            
113. See generally MIKE Report, supra note 96; ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 46. 
114. See CITES, Status of the African Elephant Populations and Level of the Illegal 
Killing and the Illegal Trade in Ivory: A Report to the African Elephant Summit, 4, 6 fig.3 
(2013) (providing graphic reports on the illegal trade). Numbers for the years 2012–2013 are 
very similar to those of 2011, with “unsustainable” poaching levels at approximately 8% (5% 
is considered “healthy”). See id. at 5, 9.  
115. See id. at 8 fig.4 (summarizing poaching data); Bruce Zagaris, CITES Meeting 
Focuses on Strategic Vision and Enforcement, 29 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 144, 144 
(2013) (“2011 display[ed] the highest levels of poaching since 2002 when MIKE started 
collecting data.”).  
116.  ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 46, at 20–22 (providing the most recent seizure 
rate data). 
117. See id. at 12 tbl.2 (explaining that China’s law enforcement is among the best).  
118. See id. (charting China’s seizure rate in comparison to other countries).  
119. See CITES, Report of the Secretariat, CoP16 Doc. 53.2.1, 5 (Mar. 3–14, 2014) 
(identifying the most troubling areas in regards to the illegal trade).  
120. See ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 46, at 12–13 tbl.2 (comparing the US ivory 
trade to other countries).  
121. See id. (highlighting that ETIS found that between 2009 and 2011, the US mean 
market score was 3.7 on a scale between -2.5 and 12). But see CITES-Approved, supra note 1, 
at 151 (arguing that the US market for ivory is “large,” but consists mainly of legal ivory). The 
mean market score is derived from the Domestic Ivory Market Database in ETIS. See T. 
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regulating the ivory trade are among the strongest and best enforced 
in the world.122 
Both MIKE and ETIS reported that there is no evidence that any 
of the CoP decisions, such as the Control of Trade Plan and the 
Resolution Conf. 10.10, have affected the illegal ivory trade.123 ETIS 
points out that the Parties have only imposed sanctions once, in 2008, 
against thirteen countries for failure to respond to a questionnaire and 
that the Parties have never imposed trade sanctions for failure to 
implement measures required under the CoP decisions.124 Finally, 
both ETIS and MIKE suggested the 2008 one-off sale and subsequent 
moratorium might have negatively impacted the illegal trade; 
however, contradicting or inadequate data precluded a conclusion 
either way.125  
ii. Responses by the Parties, Resolutions, and Decisions 
The discussion at the CoP16 was heavily focused on the 
consumer demand for ivory.126 The Secretariat, echoed by 
representatives from Kenya, Chad, the DRC, and Swaziland, 
expressed concern that consumer demand is a major influence on 
poaching.127 The Secretariat specifically named China as being the 
“only destination country . . . where trends of household consumption 
expenditure were strongly related to levels of illegal killing of 
elephants.”128 Chinese representatives acknowledged China’s role in 
                                                                                                                                     
Milliken et al., The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) and the Illicit Trade in Ivory: A 
Report to the 14th Meeting of the Conference for the Parties to CITES, CoP14 Doc. 53.2 
Annex 1 (2007).  
122. See id. (ranking the US mean score for governance performance as 1.66 on a scale 
between -2.5 and 2.5 and the level of law enforcement effort in the United States as .79 on a 
scale between 0 and 1).  
123. See id. at 10 (“[T]here is little evidence to suggest that implementation of the Action 
Plan for the Control of Trade . . . has had any impact in reducing the upward trend in illicit 
trade in ivory . . . .”); MIKE Report, supra note 96, at 7 (“[I]f these decisions had any effect on 
poaching, that effect was not discernible from the available data.”).  
124. See ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 96, at 26 (stating that the sanctions against 
the thirteen countries have since been revoked).  
125. See id. at 23–24 (explaining that in the period after the first one-off sale, the 
increase in demand was marginal as compared to the period after the second sale); MIKE 
Report, supra note 96, at 7 (noting that MIKE has not found any “discernable” evidence that 
the one-off sales or moratorium caused the increase in demand).  
126. See CITES, Summary Record of the Sixth Session of Committee II, CoP16 Com. II 
Rec. 6 (Rev. 1) 1 (Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Summary Record 6] (providing a summary of the 
different opinions by different member states).  
127. See id.  
128. Id.  
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the illegal ivory trade, but stated that African nations with elephant 
populations were best suited to combat it.129  
Finally, the CoP16 yielded no progress toward the creation of 
the DMM.130 Parties had different opinions about its purpose: some 
parties thought the DMM should be criteria for a continuing ivory 
trade, while the Secretariat and other Parties believed the DMM 
should create a process by which the parties could decide whether an 
international trade in ivory could persist at all.131 The CoP16 decided 
to table the discussion until CoP17.132   
 D. Legal Landscape: United States and China  
The United States and China have an obligation under CITES to 
strictly regulate the ivory trade, including forbidding commercial 
imports of ivory removed from the wild post-1989 and allowing only 
non-commercial imports of post-ban ivory in exceptional 
circumstances.133 Each country has enacted domestic legislation and 
subsequent legal frameworks intending to protect the African 
elephant. While the United States has a broad, but strong legal 
framework for exports and imports, this Subpart first discusses how 
federal law is limited in regards to interstate trade. Second, this 
Subpart elucidates the complex Chinese laws on the ivory trade. 
1. US Laws and Regulations: A Strong Legal Framework 
There are two key pieces of legislation regulating the ivory trade 
in the United States: the Endangered Species Act and the African 
                                                            
129. See Summary Record 6, supra note 126, at 2 (summarizing the Chinese statements 
in regards to the ivory trade).  
130. Summary of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: 3–14 
March 2013, 21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1, 27 (Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter March 18 
Summary], available at http://www.iisd.ca/cites/cop16/compilatione.pdf (summarizing the 
Parties’ ongoing to debate as to whether the DMM should be created at all).  
131. See CITES, Decision-Making Mechanism for a Process of Trade in Ivory, CoP16 
Doc. 36 (Rev. 1) 3 (Mar. 3–14 2013) (outlining the CoP16 discussion about the DMM).  
132. See CITES CoP16 Highlights: Thursday, 7 March 2013, 21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS 
BULL. 1, 4 (Mar. 8, 2014), available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2178e.pdf (“[T]he 
Secretariat directed the [Standing Committee] to postpone approval of the mechanism to 
CoP17.”); March 18 Summary, supra note 130, at 13 (“South Africa and Botswana expressed 
disappointment in delaying [DMM’s] implementation.”).      
133. See supra notes 62, 75–84 and accompanying text (describing the CITES 
requirements).  
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Elephant Conservation Act.134 The Endangered Species Act (the 
“ESA”) fulfills the United States’ international obligations under 
CITES.135 Enacted in 1973, it protects endangered or threatened 
wildlife through a category system similar to CITES Appendices but, 
instead, marks species as “endangered” or “threatened.”136 The ESA 
delegates power to the Secretary of the US Department of the Interior 
(the “Secretary”) to regulate trade in endangered or threatened 
species, with the express exception that the Secretary may not 
regulate antiques made of endangered species more than 100 years 
old unless they were repaired or modified after December 28, 1973 
(the date the ESA was enacted).137 Specific to the African elephant, 
the ESA prohibits imports and exports of raw or worked ivory 
without the permission of the Secretary.138 It also grants permission to 
an agent of the Secretary to, upon notice, inspect the inventory and 
records of any business that exports or imports ivory.139  
The African Elephant Conservation Act (the “AECA”), enacted 
in 1988, strictly regulates the ivory trade.140 The AECA prohibits 
exports of raw ivory and prohibits imports of raw or worked ivory in 
violation of CITES, another country’s laws, or any import 
moratorium, discussed infra.141 Hunters may import their sport-hunted 
                                                            
134. See African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4245 (2012); 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012). A third important law, not 
discussed in this Note, is the Lacey Act, enacted in 1900, which provides for criminal and civil 
sanctions against those involved in the illegal trade of wildlife. See 16 U.S.C. § 3373 (2012); 
Braun, supra note 63, at 565. As amended in 1981, the Lacey Act prohibits wildlife trafficking 
and false labeling of endangered species in contravention of the law. See Braun, supra note 63, 
at 565. (citing Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon, 16 PUB. LAND 
L. REV. 27, 31 (1995)); Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 33 
(statement of Dreher). 
135. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (“[T]he United States has pledged . . . to conserve to the 
extent practicable the various species of . . . wildlife . . . pursuant to [CITES] . . . .”).   
136. U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 38–39 (providing background information about 
the ESA); Treasured to Death, supra note 42, at 4 (explaining the relationship between the 
ESA and other legislation). The African Elephant was listed as threatened under the ESA in 
1978. Listing of the African Elephant as a Threatened Species, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,504 (May 12, 
1978); U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 38–39. 
137. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533(d), 1539(h) (2012) (listing the various powers and 
limitations of the Department of the Interior under the ESA).   
138. See id. § 1538(d)(1).  
139. See id. §§ 1538(d)(1)–(2).  
140. See id. §§ 4201–02; U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 36, 40. The AECA was 
enacted one year prior to CITES upgrading the African Elephant to Appendix I. See U.S. Ivory 
Trade, supra note 13, at 36, 40. 
141. See id. § 4223.  
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trophies, but may not sell them after import.142 Further, without a 
moratorium on imports, worked ivory may be imported only as 
personal effects, unless the exporting country certifies the ivory is 
derived from a legal source.143  
Under the AECA, the Secretary must impose moratoria on 
imports of ivory from countries that are (a) not Parties to CITES or 
(b) not adhering to CITES, the country’s own ivory laws, or the ivory 
laws of another country.144 The Secretary may suspend a moratorium, 
but only pursuant to a Notice and Comment period.145 Any 
moratorium cannot, however, affect sport-hunted trophies imported 
from countries that have quotas on legal hunting.146 The AECA is 
silent as to the regulation of antique ivory.147  
On June 9, 1989, the FWS, on behalf of the Secretary, acted 
pursuant to this power and imposed a moratorium on all importation 
of ivory from all nations.148 The FWS believed that because poaching 
was rampant and no country could guarantee that the ivory being 
imported into the United States derived from legal sources, a 
complete import ban was necessary.149 There is some legislative 
history to suggest that Congress disfavored the imposition of a 
complete moratorium; however, the final legislation did provide for 
that possibility.150  
                                                            
142. See id. §§ 4222(e), 4223. See also Adam Welz, Amid Elephant Slaughter, Ivory 
Trade in U.S. Continues, YALE ENVIR. 360, Feb. 13, 2014, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/amid_
elephant_slaughter_ivory_trade_in_us_continues/2738/ (last accessed on July 1, 2015) 
(discussing why the US ivory crush was important). 
143. See 16 U.S.C. § 4223. Personal effects are “articles . . . not intended for sale and are 
part of a shipment of the household effects of a . . . [move] to or from the United States . . . .” 
See id. § 4244(9). 
144. See id. §§ 4202, 4221–4222.  
145. See id. § 4222(c). 
146. See id. § 4222(e). Congress found “no evidence that sport hunting is part of the 
poaching that contributes to the illegal trade in African elephant ivory, [but instead found] that 
the proper utilization of well-managed elephant populations provides an important source of 
funding for African elephant conservation programs.” Id. § 4202(9).  
147. See African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4204-4245 (2012); see also 
Hayes et al., supra note 108, at 22 (noting that the AECA lacks a provision regarding "antique 
ivory").  
148. See Moratorium Notice, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,758 (June 9, 1989).  
149. See id. The FWS service claimed that due to the intricacy of global trade, where 
ivory may pass through several “transit” countries before its ultimate destination, it is nearly 
impossible to ensure that all ivory is, in fact, legally obtained. See id. at 24,760.   
150. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-827, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2719 
(rejecting the possibility of complete moratoria on importation in favor of “selective 
moratoria”); 134 CONG. REC. H6583 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Beilenson) 
(explaining the structure of the selective moratorium). Former Representative Anthony 
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The FWS permitted broad exceptions to the moratorium.151 For 
example, the FWS codified a special rule that applied the ESA 
antique exception to imports under the AECA.152 This special rule, 
however, is less stringent than the one under the ESA: while antiques 
less than 100 years old cannot enter, the regulation is silent on 
antiques recently restored or modified.153 Further, worked ivory 
constituting household or personal effects can be imported or 
exported, for noncommercial reasons, with a CITES certificate and 
proof that the ivory was harvested from the wild pre-February 
1973.154  
The AECA, the ESA, and the regulations created thereof provide 
limited regulatory structure for domestic trade.155 The only provision 
                                                                                                                                     
Beilenson, who sponsored the bill, withdrew support for a complete ban, which was echoed by 
all witnesses at a House hearing, except for those from the Humane Society. See H.R. Rep. No. 
100-827, at 13. The general sentiment was that a “selective moratoria” would “cut down on 
ivory demand without penalizing . . . other acceptable trade.” See id. at 14. A compromise was 
reached through African Elephant Conservation Act, Pub. L. 100–478, 102 Stat. 2322 (1988), 
(“[I]f the Secretary determines that the importation of illegally harvested ivory has not been 
substantially stopped, the Secretary shall recommend to Congress amendments to this chapter 
or other actions that may be necessary to achieve the purpose of [the AECA], including the 
establishment of a complete moratorium on the importation of elephant ivory into the United 
States.”) (emphasis added).  
151. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e) (2014). See also E. Donald Elliott, Muftiah McCartin, 
Thomas Brugato, & Kamila Lis, E-Alert: Fish and Wildlife Service Tightens Restrictions on 
Imports Under the Endangered Species Act, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, 2 (2014) 
(explaining the differences between the FWS’ previous policy and the Director’s Order).   
152. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e) (providing exceptions to the moratorium).  
153. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1539(h)(1) (“[The provisions under ESA do] not apply to any 
article which-- (A) is not less than 100 years of age; (B) is composed in whole or in part of any 
endangered species or threatened species . . . ; (C) has not been repaired or modified with any 
part of any species on or after December 28, 1973; and (D) is entered at a [designated] port.”), 
with 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(3)(ii)(A) (“Raw or worked ivory (other than sport-hunted trophies) 
may be imported only if: (1) it is a bona fide antique of greater than 100 years of age on the 
day of import, or (2) it was exported from the United States after being registered with the 
[FWS]”).     
154. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 23.15(c), (f) (2014). See also, FWS, U.S. Efforts to Control Illegal 
Elephant Ivory Trade and Internal Markets 2 (2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Efforts 
to Control Illegal Trade]. “Household effects” means “part of a household move” to or from 
the United States. The ivory must be legally acquired under CITES and must be shipped within 
one year of the move, but acquired before the change in residence. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 23.5, 
23.15(e)–(f). “Commercial” is defined as “all activities of industry and trade . . . . This does 
not include exhibition of commodities by museums or similar . . . organizations.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1532.   
155. See U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 43–44 (emphasizing that “[o]nce ivory 
enters the U.S., either legally or illegally . . . there is no way to determine the full extent of the 
ivory trade . . . . Movement of ivory products within the U.S. is . . . difficult to track because of 
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regarding domestic trade stipulates that the sale or purchase of items 
imported after February 26, 1976 and not considered antique is 
prohibited.156 It is legal to sell recently worked African elephant, as 
long as the raw ivory entered the United States before 1989.157 While 
the United States' ivory legislation regulating foreign trade is a strong 
example of CITES implementation, domestic trade regulation is 
arguably inadequate.158  
2. China’s Legal Framework: A Complex Framework  
In 1988, China enacted the law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Protection of Wildlife (the “Wildlife Protection Law”), 
which, like the ESA in the United States, provides for the protection 
of wildlife and regulation of wildlife trade.159 As amended in 2004, 
China’s Wildlife Protection Law specifies that imports and exports of 
wildlife of which trade is restricted by international conventions to 
which China is a party, must be approved and have a certificate of 
import or export.160 Pursuant to this law, commercial ivory imports 
are prohibited except for limited imports from Appendix II species 
(Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa).161 However, 
while China’s Wildlife Protection Law prohibits all “sale and 
purchase of wildlife under special state protection,” it only protects 
                                                                                                                                     
limited internal controls.”); Interior Announces Ban, supra note 4 (“The largely unregulated 
trade in elephant ivory has served as a loophole that gives cover for illegal trade.”).     
156. See U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 43 (explaining the regulations prior to the 
Director’s Order).  
157. Fisher, Global Ivory Trade, supra note 38 (citing USA’s Ivory Markets, supra note 
40, at 70–71).   
158. See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of US laws 
on the ivory trade). See also U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 44 (“Although CITES has put 
forth recommendations to control the internal ivory trade, the U.S. has not taken the necessary 
steps for their implementation.”).  
159. See generally Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Wildlife 
(“Wildlife Protection Law”), 4th meeting of the Standing Comm., 7th Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Order No. 9, 1988. See also Denise M. Sofranko, Laws and Legislation, in BIOLOGY, 
MEDICINE, AND SURGERY OF ELEPHANTS 23, 28 (Murray E. Fowler & Susan K. Mikota, ed., 
1st ed. 2006) (explaining the various laws that protect elephants).  
160. See Wildlife Protection Law, supra note 159, § 24.  
161. See EIA, Made in China: How China’s Illegal Ivory Trade is Causing a 21st 
Century African Elephant Disaster, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Made in China], available at http://
eia-global.org/images/uploads/Made_in_China_Report.pdf (outlining the history of Chinese 
law on the ivory trade); Esmond Martin & Lucy Vigne, The Ivory Dynasty: A Report on the 
Soaring Demand for Elephant and Mammoth Ivory, 7 (Elephant Family, The Aspinall Found. 
& Columbus Zoo and Aquarium, 2011), available at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.
in/files/file/EF_Ivory_Report_2011_web.pdf (reporting on the illegal ivory trade in China).  
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domestic animals.162 Therefore, the domestic sale of ivory—which are 
harvested from African elephants abroad—was permitted under this 
law.163 When China first enacted the Wildlife Protection Law, the law 
only protected domestic species, as China refused to accept the 1989 
CITES import ban.164 It was not until 1993 that the State Forestry 
Administration (the “SFA”) issued a regulation that protected foreign 
wildlife such as the African elephant.165 Further, before the 2004 
amendment, pre-convention ivory could be imported, creating a 
loophole whereby importers would pre-date their ivory to circumvent 
the law.166 Finally, despite the enactment of the Wildlife Protection 
Act, in 2002 ETIS reported that China had one “of the largest 
unregulated ivory markets in the world” and that the Chinese 
government “demonstrate[d] very poor law enforcement effort and 
efficiency, and consequently exert[ed] the greatest contemporary 
influence on illegal trade in ivory.”167 
In 2004 and 2006, China enacted the regulatory system it has 
today.168 In May 2004, in addition to amending the Wildlife 
Protection Act, the SFA issued a notification requiring that all ivory 
be registered and sold with a certificate, called a “Certificate of Ivory 
Products Collection.”169 If an item weighs over 50 grams (about 1.8 
                                                            
162. See Wildlife Protection Law, supra note 159, §§ 8, 22.  
163. See Caitlin O'Connell-Rodwell & Rob Parry-Jones, An Assessment of China's 
Management of Trade in Elephants and Elephant Products, 3 TRAFFIC ONLINE REPORT 
SERIES 9 (2002) (noting that before 1993, only Asian elephants were protected under the 
Wildlife Protection Act); Peter J. Li, Enforcing Wildlife Protection in China: The Legislative 
and Political Solutions, 21 CHINA INFO. 71, 76–77 (2007).  
164. See Made in China, supra note 161, at 4; U.S. Ivory Market Collapses After Import 
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 5, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/05/science/us-ivory-market-
collapses-after-import-ban.html (analyzing the effect of listing the African Elephant as 
Appendix I); see also Markets of East Asia, supra note 48, at 68 (discussing China's previous 
reservation to the CITES 1990 ivory ban).  
165. See Wang Xinxia, The Implementation of CITES in China, in IMPROVING 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 206 (Jacob Werksman et al. eds., 
1996) (explaining that in April of 1993, the African Elephant was “approved by the Ministry 
of Forestry to be . . . under state protection”); Made in China, supra note 161, at 4 
(summarizing the laws in China).   
166. See Made in China, supra note 161, at 4.  
167. CITES, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens: Summary Report on 
the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), CoP12 Doc. 34.1, 5 (Nov. 3–15 2002). 
168. See id.   
169. WildAid, supra note 60, at 2; Esmond Martin & Lucy Vigne, Consumption of 
Elephant and Mammoth Ivory Increase in Southern China, 49 PACHYDERM 79, 81 (Jan.–June 
2011) [hereinafter Consumption of Elephant Ivory].  
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ounces), the object must be displayed next to a photograph.170 Further, 
ivory may be carved by only certain factories and sold by certain 
dealers, as approved and licensed by the SFA.171 Factories receive an 
allocation of legal ivory every year from state stocks.172 In 2005 there 
were eleven authorized factories and fifty-one authorized wholesalers 
and retailers.173 By the summer of 2013, the SFA approved a total of 
thirty-seven factories and 145 retailers.174  
In 2006, the State Council issued the Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Administration of the Import and Export of 
Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora (the “Administration 
Regulation”).175 This regulation brought China’s wildlife trade 
directly in line with CITES trade system.176 Specifically, whatever 
CITES prohibits or requires, the SFA ensures that China is line with 
that decision.177 Therefore, commercial imports and exports of ivory 
are prohibited.178 The regulation further specifics that imports and 
exports of non-commercial ivory must meet stringent requirements 
such as those for loading and transporting ivory.179 Finally, the 
                                                            
170. See Consumption of Elephant Ivory, supra note 169, at 81; Market in China 2, 
supra note 49. 
171. See IFAW, Analysis of the Chinese Ivory Registration and Certification System, 2 
(2005) [hereinafter Certificate System Analysis], available at http://www.ifaw.org/sites/
default/files/Analysis%20of%20the%20Chinese%20Ivory%20Registration%20and%20certific
ation%20system%20-%202005.pdf; Made in China, supra note 161, at 9.  
172. See McMahon, supra note 51; Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 24 (citing State 
Forest Association [PRC], Notice on Strengthening the Management of Ivory and its Products, 
2008) (“The amount of raw ivory released to the current market is controlled to about 5 tons 
per year.”).  
173. See Certificate System Analysis, supra note 171, at 2; Made in China, supra note 
161, at 10. 
174. See Rethinking Ivory, supra note 58, at 98; Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 254.  
175. See generally Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of 
Import and Export of Endangered Wild Animals and Plants (promulgated by St. Council, Apr. 
29, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), Decree No. 465 (2006) (China).    
176. See id. § 2 (“Where the . . . [CITES] restricts the import or export of endangered 
fauna and flora as well as the products thereof, it shall be governed by the present 
Regulation.”).  
177. See id. § 3 (“The administrative department[] of forestry . . . shall . . . take charge of 
the administration of the import and export of endangered fauna and flora . . . throughout the 
country and do a good job in the relevant work relating to the performance of the 
Convention.”).  
178. See id. § 6 (“It is prohibited to import or export any endangered wild fauna and 
flora as well the products thereof whose import or export is prohibited by the Convention for 
any purpose of commercial trade.”).  
179. See id. §§ 6, 8–10.  
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regulation criminalizes the issuance of permits by state officials in 
contravention of the regulation.180 
Despite this robust regulatory structure, many conservationists 
and scholars claim that the system “seems to have little effect on the 
illegal trade in ivory.”181 Some scholars estimate that up to ninety 
percent of ivory in China is illegal.182 Certificates are often reused and 
photographs do not match the item for sale.183 One report found that a 
factory owner purchased a license to sell ivory for US $321,000.184 
Conversely, new reports are issued frequently announcing the arrest 
and prosecution of illegal ivory traders in China.185 Overall, however, 
the Chinese laws and regulations regarding the ivory trade are 
complex, but poorly enforced.186 While China has taken other 
symbolic actions, the Chinese government has not pursued legislative 
or regulatory remedies to rectify the current regulatory gaps in the 
Chinese system.187  
                                                            
180. See id. §§ 24–27; see also Made in China, supra note 161, at 4 (discussing relevant 
portions of the Chinese import regulations).  
181. See, e.g., Market in China 2, supra note 49. See also Joseph Vandegrift, Elephant 
Poaching: CITES Failure to Combat the Growth in Chinese Demand for Ivory, 31 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 102, 119 (citing Made in China, supra note 161, at 3–11) (“China’s regulations of the 
domestic ivory trade leave many loopholes for companies still attempting to produce and sell 
illegal ivory.”).  
182. See From Elephants’ Mouths, supra note 18, at A1; Ana Swanson, How China's 
Ivory Addiction Explains the New World Economy, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2014, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/07/how-chinas-ivory-addiction-explains-
the-new-world-economy/.  
183. See From Elephants’ Mouths, supra note 18, at A1; Grammaticas, supra note 56.  
184. See From Elephants’ Mouths, supra note 18.  
185. See, e.g., 14 Arrested for Ivory Trading in North China, CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Jan. 
20, 2015, www.chinadaily.com.cn.china/2015-01/20/content_19360436.htm (announcing the 
arrest of fourteen suspects involved in an ivory trading ring as a result of a ten month 
investigation by the public security bureau in the Hebei Province); Man Imprisoned for 
Smuggling Tiger Bones, Ivory, CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Nov. 17, 2014, www.Chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2014-11/17/content_18929088.htm (reporting the sentencing of a smuggler to a six-
year imprisonment term by a court in Shandong, China).    
186. See John Frederick Walker, The Case for a legal Ivory Trade: It Could Help Stop 
the Slaughter, YALE ENVIR. 360, Oct 13, 2014 [hereinafter Case for a Legal Trade], http://
e360.yale.edu/feature/point_the_case_for_a_legal_ivory_trade_it_could_help_stop_the_slaugh
ter/2814/ (arguing that China's legal ivory trade provides a cover for illegal ivory because of 
“lax” enforcement of Chinese laws); WildAid, supra note 60 (“Unfortunately, within the legal 
channels of the [Chinese] ivory trade, there are many ways to easily acquire and sell ivory 
illegally.”).  
187. See, e.g., Press Release, CITES, China and CITES Secretariat to Tackle the 
Demand for Illegal Ivory (Jan. 28, 2015), available at cites.org/eng/China_ivory_workshop_
release (announcing a two-day workshop held in Hangzhou, China co-organized by the 
government of China and CITES that analyzed the ivory market); Up In Smoke, supra note 33 
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E. United States Pushes for A Total Ban: 2014 and Proposed Action 
While China has not issued any new domestic laws or 
regulations, the United States is enhancing its regulatory and 
enforcement structure regarding the ivory trade.188 After the CoP16, 
the United States made counteracting the illegal ivory trade and 
poaching a priority.189 The Federal Government takes the position that 
continuous poaching coupled with the evidence that illegal ivory trade 
funds terrorism is a threat to national security.190 The Obama 
Administration is taking action to close domestic “loopholes” that 
provide a means through which the illegal ivory trade persists.191 In 
doing so, the United States hopes to be a role model to other countries 
like China by encouraging these countries to take similar actions.192 
This Subpart first explores the initial Executive Order and subsequent 
National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, which sets out 
the US agenda for counteracting the international and domestic illegal 
ivory trade. Second, a discussion follows of the regulations the FWS 
has taken or plans to take pursuant to this Strategy. Finally, this 
Subpart discusses the United States' work with China and its attempt 
                                                                                                                                     
(discussing the Chinese ivory crush). This, however, may change in the near future. See Press 
Release, CITES, CITES Secretary-General meets Chinese Vice Prime Minister in Beijing (Jan. 
30, 2015), available at cites.org/eng/CITES_SG_meets_China_Vice_Premier (summarizing 
the meeting between Secretary-General of CITES and Administrator Zhao Shucong of the 
SFA, which focused on “reducing the demand for illegally sourced wildlife . . . and cracking 
down in illegal wildlife trade through enforcement measures”).  
188. See Exec. Order No. 13,648, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,621, 40,621 (July 5, 2013) (“In order 
to enhance domestic efforts to combat wildlife trafficking . . . agencies[] shall . . . promulg[ate] 
. . . rules and regulations . . . to combat wildlife trafficking.”); FWS Moves To Ban, supra note 
13 (“We are currently undertaking a series of administrative actions to implement a nearly 
complete ban on commercial elephant ivory trade.”).   
189. Ashe Testimony May 21, 2014, supra note 9, at 6 (“The decisions agreed upon at 
[the] CoP16 to address the elephant poaching crisis were a significant step in the right 
direction. The United States . . . is committed to playing a significant role in their 
implementation . . . .”); Top Priorities for the United States at C0P16, FWS, http://www.fws.
gov/international/cites/cop16/top-priorities.html (last visited July 1, 2015).  
190. See Ashe Testimony May 21, 2014, supra note 9, at 6. 
191. Exec. Order No. 13,648, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40,621–40,623 (laying out the agenda 
regarding reducing wildlife trade, including the trade of elephant specimens); see also Ashe 
Testimony May 21, 2014, supra note 9, at 7 (explaining the steps the FWS will take to close 
legislative and regulatory “loopholes . . . that are exploited by illegal ivory traders”).  
192. See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 47 
(statement Gerald E. Connolly, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (“We have got to look 
at best practices and try to encourage them elsewhere.”); see also Ashe Testimony May 21, 
2014, supra note 9, at 8 (“Taking these measures will establish U.S. leadership and support 
diplomatic efforts to encourage demand reduction in consumer nations. The United States . . . 
must lead by example.”).  
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to influence the Chinese government to take similar actions as the 
United States.  
  1. The Executive Order and the “Strategy” 
In July 2013, President Obama issued an Executive Order that 
outlined four clear goals: (1) assist other countries in combating 
illegal trade, (2) help other countries create and enforce effective laws 
to prohibit and prosecute illegal trade, (3) combat trafficking, and (4) 
reduce the demand for illegally traded wildlife both domestically and 
abroad, “while allowing legal and legitimate commerce involving 
wildlife.”193 The Executive Order also created a Presidential Task 
Force chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the 
Secretary of State, and the Attorney General with senior level 
membership of most Executive Departments.194 President Obama 
charged the Task Force with creating a strategy consistent with 
domestic and international law within 180 days to support anti-
poaching activities and coordinate law enforcement, as well as 
develop effective legal enforcement mechanisms and “develop 
strategies to reduce illicit trade and reduce consumer demand for trade 
in protected species.”195 
In February 2014, the administration approved the National 
Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking (the “National 
Strategy”).196 This document is geared toward encouraging other 
countries to enact and better enforce anti-smuggling legislation.197 
While dealing with each of the topics identified in the Executive 
Order, the Strategy mainly focused on the last objective: reduce 
demand through enacting a near-complete ban.198  
  2. The FWS: The Beginning of the Ban  
In February 2014, the FWS and the Department of the Interior 
(the “DOI”) announced that the FWS would take steps to enact a 
                                                            
193. Exec. Order No. 13,648, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40,621 (announcing that besides elephants, 
the Strategy is also focused on the trade of rhinoceros, great apes, tigers, sharks, tuna, and 
turtles). 
194. See id. at 40621–22.   
195. See id. at 40622–23. 
196. National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, Exec. Office of the 
President, 1, passim (Feb. 11, 2014).  
197. See generally id. 
198. See generally id.  
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near-complete ban on the commercial trade of ivory.199 The current 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Sally Jewell, announced, 
“a commercial ban is a critical element in the President’s strategy to 
stop illegal wildlife trafficking and to shut down criminal markets that 
encourage poaching.”200 Daniel Ashe, the Director of the FWS, 
echoed this view and added that the basis of the ban is that the US 
“market is contributing to the crisis now threatening the African 
elephant.”201 The plan was to eliminate exceptions to the AECA 
moratorium, which allowed the import of commercial antique 
ivory.202 Further, the FWS intends to impose a quota on imports of 
sport-hunted trophies.203 With the exception of “a narrow class of 
antiques,” exports of ivory will be prohibited and the domestic sale 
will be restricted.204 Under the proposed regulations only ivory legally 
imported pre-1990, with the exception of antiques, may be sold.205 
The burden is on the owner to prove that the ivory is, in fact, an 
                                                            
199. See Wildlife Trafficking: New Restrictions on Commercial Elephant Ivory and 
Rhinoceros Horn Trade, FWS [hereinafter New Restrictions], http://www.fws.gov/wildlife-
trafficking-questions-and-answers.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2014) (answering questions 
about the new ban); Interior Announces Ban, supra note 4 (announcing the ban).  
200. See Interior Announces Ban, supra note 4 (publicizing the US plan to enact a near-
complete ban on the ivory trade); see also Press Release, DOI, Presidential Taskforce Releases 
Plan for the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife (Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/presidential-taskforce-releases-implementation-plan-for-the-
national-strategy-for-combating-wildlife-trafficking.cfm (announcing the subsequent release of 
the implementation plan for the National Strategy).  
201. See Interior Announces Ban, supra note 4 (demonstrating Daniel Ashe’s support for 
proposed ban); Press Release, FWS, Service Takes Next Steps in Commercial Elephant Ivory 
Trade Ban, Eases Restrictions on Musical Instruments and Other Uses (May 15, 2015) (“By 
implementing a near complete ban on trade . . . we are effectively closing loopholes and 
eliminating the cover provided by legal commercial trade . . . .”).  
202. See New Restrictions, supra note 199 (outlining the two steps the FWS anticipated 
taking by June 2014 to prohibit commercial imports); see also Interior Announces Ban, supra 
note 4 (explaining what the FWS intends to do regarding ivory). 
203. FWS Moves to Ban, supra note 13 (revealing that sport-hunted trophies will be 
limited to two per person per year); see also FWS, Importation of Elephant Hunting Trophies 
Taking in Tanzania and Zimbabwe in 2015 and Beyond: Questions and Answers, July 10, 2015 
(extending a moratorium on imports of sport trophies from Tanzania and Zimbabwe enacted 
on April 4, 2014), available at http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/questions-and-answers-
suspension-of-elephant-sport-hunted-trophies.pdf  
204.  Interior Announces Ban, supra note 4 (expounding on how the National Strategy 
will impact domestic ivory sales); New Restrictions, supra note 199 (explaining that domestic 
sales were to be limited as far as constitutionally and statutorily possible).  
205. See supra note 204 (noting the effect of the National Strategy on domestic policy).  
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antique.206 This shift in burden would align the United States with the 
CITES' Control of Trade Plan.207   
As of July 1, 2015, the FWS has implemented the first of the 
actions.208 On February 25, 2014, the FWS released Director’s Order 
210 (the “Director's Order”).209 The Director's Order “establishes the 
policy and procedure for [FWS] employees to implement the National 
Strategy.”210 Specifically, it forbids all imports of commercial ivory, 
even antique ivory.211 Certain noncommercial imports of African 
elephant ivory are permitted.212 These include raw or worked ivory by 
an agency for law enforcement purposes and raw or worked ivory for 
“genuine scientific purpose” that will further conservation efforts.213 
Worked ivory may also be imported for personal use as part of a 
household move or inheritance.214 Worked ivory that is part of a 
                                                            
206. See FWS Moves To Ban, supra note 13 (listing the requirements for permissible 
sales of ivory); Doug Bandow, Obama Administration Treats Antique Collectors and Dealers 
as Criminals: New Ivory Rules Put Elephants at Risk, FORBES, Feb. 17, 2014 [hereinafter 
Administration Treats Collectors as Criminals], http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/
2014/02/17/obama-administration-treats-antique-collectors-and-dealers-as-criminals-new-ivo
ry-rules-put-elephants-at-increased-risk/?&_suid=141437116561707074179877527058  
(noting that the new requirements shift the burden of proof from the government to ivory 
owners).  
207. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the Control of Trade Plan).   
208. See Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1.  
209. See id. On May 15, 2014, the FWS amended the Director’s Order to take into 
account some of the domestic pushback, discussed infra. See id. The amendment eased the 
requirements under the noncommercial import exceptions such as for musical instruments. See 
infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text.  
210. See Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1. The Director’s Order was not 
published in either the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. See 16 U.S.C. § 
724b(b) (2012) (“The functions of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service shall be 
administered under the supervision of the Director . . . .”).  
211. See FWS Moves to Ban, supra note 13 (answering questions about the Director’s 
Order); Notification to the Parties, CITES, United States of America: Stricter Domestic 
Measures Regarding Import of African Elephant Ivory, No. 2014/045 (Oct. 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter Notification No. 2014/045] (announcing the new US policy regarding import of 
African elephant ivory).   
212. See FWS Moves to Ban, supra note 13; Notification No. 2014/045, supra note 211 
(describing the import ban). These items may not be sold within the United States. See 50 
C.F.R. § 23.5 (2014) (defining noncommercial as activity not “likely to result in economic use, 
gain, or benefit, including, but not limited to profit (whether cash or in kind)”); see also 50 
C.F.R. § 23.55 (2014) (discussing the so-called “use after-import” rules, which as of the June 
26, 2014 amendments, allow Appendix I species to be used for only noncommercial purposes 
after import).  
213. See Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1. 
214. See id. As of the May 2014 amendment, the requirements for importing under this 
exception requires the ivory be legally acquired before February 26, 1976, has not been traded 
for profit post-February 25, 2014, and item has a CITES Certificate. Id. §§ 2(b)(3)–(4).  
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musical instrument may also be imported.215 Finally, imports of ivory 
as part of traveling exhibition are permitted.216 While further action is 
expected in the near future, the Director’s Order constitutes the only 
action in regards to the US ivory trade the FWS has taken as of July 1, 
2015.217 
3. The United States Pressures China to Reduce the Illegal Ivory 
Trade 
The United States has taken other actions internationally 
pursuant to the Executive Order, particularly in collaboration with 
China.218 Through collaborating with China, the United States hopes 
to influence the Chinese government to take similar actions and 
impose a complete ban.219 In January 2014, after encouragement from 
the United States, China destroyed six tons of seized illegally traded 
ivory.220 Also in January, as part of the National Strategy, the United 
States joined China in a global anti-illegal trade operation called 
                                                            
215. See id. This portion of the Director's Order is likely a result of CITES' new 
certificate system for musical instruments, created at the CoP16. See CITES, Frequent Cross-
Border Non-Commercial Movements of Musical Instruments, Resolution Conf. 16.8 (Mar. 
2013). For a detailed analysis, see Nicole Blumenkehl, Out of Tune Ivory Policy: Unintended 
Consequences for Musicians (Nov. 19, 2014) (unpublished Note), available at http://law.duke.
edu/sites/default/files/academics/studentscholars/Blumenkehl_paper.pdf.  
216. See Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1, § 2(b). As of the May 2014 
amendment, the requirements for importing under this exception the ivory must have legally 
acquired before February 26, 1976, has not been traded for profit since February 25, 2014, the 
individual or group has a CITES certificate, and the exhibition meets the requirements for an 
exhibition traveling internationally pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 23.49 (2012). See id. § 2(b)(5).  
217. See FWS Moves to Ban, supra note 13 (discussing future expected FWS actions). 
See also Interior Announces Ban, supra note 4, for the press announcement on the issue. 
218. In late 2013/early 2014, the Task Force took other actions pursuant to the Executive 
Order’s objectives, including crushing six tons of seized ivory in Colorado; pursuing the 
capture of Vixay Keosavang, leader of the Xaysavang Network; and allocating US $60 million 
to support the National Strategy. See US Support for Combating Trafficking, supra note 26; 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 2 (statement of Royce). 
219. See Hearing before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 47 
(statement of Jones) (discussing the US partnership with China in reducing the illegal market 
for ivory); (Rep.) Peter DeFazio, Illegal Ivory Trade and Administration Actions to Combat 
Wildlife Trafficking, NAT. RES. COMM. (June 24, 2014), available at http://democrats.
naturalresources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/files/404/Ivory%20Pre
ss%20Packet%206-24-14.pdf (“The Presidential Task Force . . . made the case for the U.S. to . 
. . clos[e] loopholes . . . as a means of setting an example and putting more pressure on 
China.”).  
220. See McMahon, supra note 172.  
1548 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1511 
“Operation Cobra II.”221 Coordinating with law enforcers from 
twenty-six other countries, China and the United States led a task 
force resulting in 400 arrests and over 350 wildlife seizures, including 
three metric tons of elephant ivory.222 As the next step, the FWS 
service hoped China would enact an ivory trade ban similar, if not 
stricter, than the one proposed in the United States.223 On February 
26, 2015, China’s State Forestry Administration announced it was 
imposing a one-year moratorium on all imports of ivory carvings.224   
In summary, after the bleak reports and slow progress of the 
CoP16, the United States has taken significant measures to reduce the 
overall demand for ivory. It has done so by creating and beginning to 
implement policies to decrease the trade in all ivory. Also, the United 
States is working with trade partners in China in hopes that it too will 
enact similar policies that will decrease the illegal trade of ivory and, 
as a result, poaching in Africa.  
II. THE LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES OF A COMPLETE 
IVORY BAN  
The FWS’ proposed and realized actions have legal and policy 
implications that have caused domestic pushback.225 In China, while 
                                                            
221. Press Release, FWS, Conservationists Applaud Global Wildlife Protection 
Operation: “Operation Cobra II” Nets Traffickers in Africa and Asia, 1 (Feb. 11, 2014), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2014/pdf/1-Operation-Cobra-II-PR-FN-FWS.
pdf; CITES Secretariat Welcomes Operation Cobra II Results, CITES, http://www.cites.org/
eng/news/sundry/2014/20140210_operation_cobra_ii.php (last updated Feb. 10, 2014). 
“Operation Cobra” was the name of the 1944 attack under Lieutenant Bradley to repel German 
ground troops during World War II and transformed the war from one “of attrition into a war 
of movement.” See Rick Atkinson, Operation Cobra and the Breakout of Normandy, U.S. 
ARMY, http://www.army.mil/article/42658/_quot_Operation_COBRA_and_the_Breakout_at_
Normandy__quot_/ (last updated July 22, 2010). 
222. See Press Release, Operation Cobra II, African, Asian, and North American Law 
Enforcement Officers Teams up to Apprehend Wildlife Criminals (Feb. 10, 2014), available at 
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/news/sundry/2014/operation_cobra_ii_pr.pdf. 
223. Latest News Archive, FWS, http://www.fws.gov/international/latest-news-archive.
html (last visited July 1, 2015) (“With the support of the []FWS . . . Yao Ming delivered a 
petition to the Chin[a] . . . asking that China’s government ban the sale of ivory.”).  
224. See Dan Levin, China Bans Import of Ivory Carvings for One Year, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2015, at A12 [hereinafter One Year Ban in China] (reporting on the temporary 
moratorium and questioning whether it will have any effect on the ivory trade); China Imposes 
One-Year Ban on Ivory Imports, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-31648475 (announcing the one-year moratorium in China).  
225. Doug Bandow, The Administration’s New Ivory Ban: I’m From the Government 
and I’m Here to Kill Elephants and Treat Americans as Criminals, FORBES, Mar. 17, 2014 
[hereinafter The Administration's New Ivory Ban], http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/
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some conservationists, activists, and scholars (including Chinese 
students) call for a domestic ban similar to the one the United States 
proposes, other conservationists, activists, and scholars argue that 
such a ban is not only unlikely to happen, but also that ban in China 
would not resolve the illegal trade and may even enhance it.226 This 
Part focuses on the legal and policy implications of the FWS’ 
proposed plan, with special attention to the Director's Order, and the 
problems with creating a similar ban in China. Part II.A explores 
potential legal claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Part II.B discusses US 
domestic pushback from antique dealers, museums, and other 
interested parties. Part II.C discusses policy implications of imposing 
a similar ban in China.  
A. Legal Implications of a Near-Complete Ban in the United 
States 
The FWS’ taken and proposed actions, particularly the 
Director’s Order, raise statutory and constitutional questions under 
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause.227 Some lawyers and commentators maintain that the 
Director’s Order should have been issued pursuant to Notice and 
Comment.228 Some commentators further claim that the National 
Strategy will result in the diminution of individual property rights, 
                                                                                                                                     
2014/03/17/the-administrations-new-ivory-ban-im-from-the-government-and-im-here-to-kill-
elephants-and-treat-americans-as-criminals/ (discussing some of the legal and practical 
implications of the Director's Order and the FWS proposed actions); Mashberg, supra note 5, 
at A15 (exploring the various reactions the FWS' actions).   
226. Compare Mary Rice, The Case Against a Legal Ivory Trade: It Will Lead to More 
Killing of Elephants, YALE ENVIR. 360, Oct. 13, 2014, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/counterp
oint_the_case_against_a_legal_ivory_trade_it_will_lead_to_more_killing_of_elephants/2815/  
(advocating for a complete ivory ban), and Laurel Neme, In Hong Kong, Kids Take Action to 
Stop the Illegal Ivory Trade, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Apr. 24, 2014, http://news.nationalgeo
graphic.com/news/2014/04/140425-hong-kong-ivory-trafficking-elephants-china-world/ 
(reporting on an anti-trade campaign in Hong Kong spearheaded by children), with Ivory 
Trade Ban, supra note 18  (“I am convinced that attempts to completely restrict all ivory sales 
. . . are backfiring tragically on elephants.”), and Dalya Alberge, Dealers Defend Trade in 
Ivory Objects, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d1d013e0-a2c8-
11e3-ba21-00144feab7de.html (elucidating pushback by art dealers).          
227. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-559, 
701-706, 1305 (2012), for the complete Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  
228. See infra note 243 and accompanying text (noting concern that FWS allegedly did 
not follow APA procedure).  
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amounting to a regulatory taking.229 Precedent interpreting the 
Administrative Procedure Act, discussed herein, suggests there may 
have been a potential deficiency in procedure on the part of the FWS 
in creating the Director’s Order.230 Similarly, fundamental 
jurisprudence regarding the Fifth Amendment is instructive on 
potential regulatory takings claims.231  
1. Regulatory Implications: Can the Director’s Order Survive the 
APA? 
This section examines whether the FWS adhered to the 
procedures prescribed by law in creating the Director’s Order.232 The 
following analysis will proceed assuming that standing is not at issue 
and that the FWS will act pursuant to the Director's Order, i.e. seize or 
permanently confiscate ivory being imported into the United States.233 
Without this action, the Director's Order is not ripe for judicial 
review.234 
Enacted in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) 
is the statutory codification of the procedure an agency must take 
when creating regulations pursuant to its statutory obligations and 
power delegated by Congress.235 This procedure is meant to “temper” 
                                                            
229. See infra note 278 and accompanying text (raising the question of whether the 
National Strategy effectuates a taking of personal property).  
230. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (illuminating possible arguments under the APA).   
231. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (exploring potential takings claims).  
232. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(a), (c)–(d) (2012) (codifying the scope of judicial review under 
the APA).  
233. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (requirements for review of agency action); see also Broadgate, 
Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 730 F. Supp. 2d 240, 243 (2010) (holding that 
the requirement for standing is agency action, and that the plaintiff has no other remedy).  
234. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–808 (2003) 
(quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967), abrogated on other 
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)) (“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine 
designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling 
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the 
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decisions has been formalized and 
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’”); see also Ripe, LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/ripe (last visited July 1 2015) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1) (explaining that 
claims are ripe for judicial review when “the facts of a case have matured into an existing 
substantial controversy warranting judicial intervention”).  
235. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-559, 701-706, 1305 (2012), for 
the codified APA. See also Isabel Salovarra & Adam Augusiak-Boro, A Guide to Careers in 
Administrative Law, PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.psjd.org/getResourceFile.cfm?ID=116 (explaining the structure and background of 
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abuses of power by executive agencies.236 Under authority delegated 
by Congress through statutes, agencies create regulations either 
through formal or informal rulemaking—a.k.a. Notice-and-Comment 
Rulemaking—or through adjudication in the form of orders.237 
However, agencies are entitled to issue interpretations of statutory 
clauses, make procedural rules, and issue policy statements without 
rulemaking or adjudication.238 One of the litigious areas of 
administrative law is defining the boundary between a “substantive 
rule,” which is given a high level of judicial deference and, therefore, 
must be promulgated through rulemaking or adjudication, and these 
other types of “rules” and statements, which do not have the force of 
law, but are still given a level of judicial deference.239 When an 
agency issues a statement without some form of rule-making process, 
the agency action is “more vulnerable to attack.”240 
                                                                                                                                     
the APA); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 894–95, 899–900, 937–39 
(5th ed. 2014) (recounting how President Roosevelt's New Deal gave birth to administrative 
law as it is known today). Agencies are “units of government” comprised of fifteen Executive 
Cabinet Departments (e.g. DOI) and other Independent Agencies (e.g. Environmental 
Protection Agency).  
236. See Martin Shapiro, Golden Anniversary: The Administrative procedure Act of 
1946, A, 19 REGULATION 40, 41 (1996) (explaining the purpose of the APA); Vanessa K. 
Burrows, Administrative Law Judges: An Overview, CRS REPORT, 1 (Apr. 13, 2010) (“The 
[APA] was enacted . . . to ensure fairness and due process in executive agency actions or 
proceedings involving rulemaking and adjudications.”).        
237. See JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.01 (2014) (explaining the 
basic principles of administrative law); Guide to Administrative Law, LIBRARY OF CONG., 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php (last updated Jan. 5, 2015) (paraphrasing 
regulatory procedure). Most rules are created by Notice and Comment or through adjudication. 
See id. Adjudication is much like any court proceeding that has precedential status, except the 
proceedings are before an administrative law judge. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 235, at 
960–61. Rules created pursuant to Notice and Comment are issued in the Federal Register and 
then, once the public has a chance to comment, are codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. See STEIN ET AL., supra note 237, § 1.02 (describing the rulemaking process).      
238. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 235, at 973–74 (defining interpretive rules and 
policy statements); Robert Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, 
Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L. J. 
1311, 1315 (1992) (“[U]nder the taxonomy of the APA, a rulemaking action that the agency 
wishes to make binding upon affect persons must be either a legislative rule (which binds 
legally) or an interpretive rule (which may bind practically). All other . . . ‘policy statements[]’ 
. . . the agency is not entitled to make binding, either as a legal matter or as a practice 
matter.”).   
239. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (listing the exceptions to rulemaking procedures); 
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 235, at 1039–44, 1171–72 (expounding on judicial review and 
levels of deference given to agency actions).   
240. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (finding that requirements for certain x-ray reading levels were interpretive rules 
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The FWS issued the Director’s Order without Notice and 
Comment or publication in the Federal Register.241 Through the 
Director’s Order, the FWS is enforcing the moratorium and 
eliminating the importation exceptions.242 Some practitioners and 
commentators question whether the FWS should have issued the 
content of the Director's Order pursuant to Notice and Comment.243 
Other lawyers, however, argue that the Director's Order is a statement 
of the FWS’ policy not to enforce the moratorium to the fullest extent 
possible.244  
According to the text, the Director’s Order “establishes policy 
and procedure for [FWS] employees to implement the National 
Strategy as it relates to the trade in elephant ivory . . . .”245 The 
Director’s Order, therefore, purports to be a policy statement, telling 
employees and the public how the FWS will enforce the 
moratorium.246 General statements of policy advise the public on how 
                                                                                                                                     
and, therefore, were not subject to APA rulemaking requirements); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. ET 
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 237 (6th ed. 2010) ( “[A]ny agency 
statement not subjected to Notice and Comment will be more vulnerable to attack not only in 
court but also within the agency itself.”) (emphasis omitted).  
241. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances in which 
the Director’s Order was created).  
242. See New Restrictions, supra note 199. While the statute of limitations has run for an 
abuse of discretion claim under the APA, Congress arguably wanted to reserve the power to 
enforce a complete moratorium or any other action outside the scope granted by 50 U.S.C. § 
4222. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (“[T]he secretary shall recommend to 
Congress amendments to this chapter or other actions . . . including the establishment of a 
complete moratorium.”) (emphasis added).  
243. See E. Donald Elliott, McCartin, Brugato, & Lis, supra note 151, at 3 (noting that 
part of the public outcry against the ban as the FWS’s failure to provide for a period of Notice 
and Comment); Rick St. Hilaire, Ivory Ban Dispute Requires Consensus-Building If Future 
TOC Task Forces are to be Formed, CULTURAL HERITAGE LAWYER RICK ST. HILAIRE BLOG 
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com/2014/03/ivory-ban-dispute-requi
res-consensus.html (noting the “arguments that collective punishment is being exacted on 
innocent citizens and that there has been no opportunity for a public hearing . . . .”). 
244. See Daniel T. Shedd & Todd Garvey, A Primer on the Reviewability of Agency 
Delay and Enforcement Discretion, CRS REPORT 4 (Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (arguing that Heckler is 
applicable to the Director’s Order). 
245. Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1 (emphasis added) (explaining the purpose 
of the Director’s Order).  
246. See Shedd & Garvey, supra note 244, at 10, n.71 (arguing that Director’s Order was 
created within the legal confines of the APA). For example, household objects in a move or 
those in an inheritance may be imported but not antiques. See supra notes 211–14 and 
accompanying text (explaining the Director's Order).  
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an agency proposes to act in the future.247 Of key importance is that 
policy statements simply note the agency's “leaning” in regards to a 
particular issue and sets the agenda for future action.248 Certainly, 
language in the Director’s Order, such as emphasizing employees’ 
discretionary power with regards to implementation, supports this 
theory.249 Previous orders issued by the FWS’ director, however, were 
never in regards to enforcement action against the public, but are 
more administrative in nature.250 Therefore, while the Director’s 
Order purports to be a policy statement, it could be considered 
substantive such that Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking was 
required?251  
As mentioned above, policy statements need not be promulgated 
pursuant to Notice and Comment.252 However, if the rule imposes a 
substantive requirement on the public, then it must be promulgated 
                                                            
247. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (explaining the differences between the 
different types of rules under the APA); see also Syncor Intern. Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 
94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Vietnam 
Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537–39 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Pacific Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) (“Policy Statements are binding on 
neither the public, nor the agency.”).  
248. See Anthony, supra note 238, at 1324 (explaining policy statements). See also 
Hudson v. F.A.A., 192 F.3d 1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing United States Tel. Ass’n v. 
FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that policy statements are “only supposed 
to indicate an agency's inclination or leaning, not in any way binding on the agency.”).  
249. See Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1 ("employees must strictly implement 
and enforce the . . . moratorium . . . as a matter of law enforcement discretion."). See also Am. 
Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (citing McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 
1317, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (noting that agency actions are “less likely to be general 
policy statements when it purports . . . to restrict agency discretion”).    
250. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Director’s Order No. 69. (Mar. 30, 1994), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/do69.html (“All Service units shall expeditiously 
transfer salvageable eagle carcasses and eagle parts to the National Eagle Repository.”); U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, Director's Order No. 194 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/do194.html (describing the “responsibilities for making intra-
Service [ESA] section 7 determinations (or findings) of effects for endangered, threatened, 
[etc.] . . . species” and extending “redelegation of authority . . . for making these 
determinations from officers in the Endangered Species Program to officers within other 
Service programs”). This may also be an indication that the Director's Order is more 
substantive in nature. See infra notes 259–69 and accompanying text (exploring the 
substantive qualities of the Director's Order).   
251. The Federal Court of Appeals notes that first impressions of a rule can deceive and 
that an agency’s action may be more than it purports. See U.S. Dept. of Transp. v. Outdoor 
Adver. Assoc. of Am., Inc., _ F. Supp. 2d _, No. 13-93 (JEB), 2014 WL 2803084, at *4 
(2014). 
252. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.  
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pursuant to Notice and Comment.253 While interpretive rules, another 
type of rule subject to the exception for rulemaking, have an express 
four-factor test outlined in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety 
& Health Administration; the courts have not identified a preferred 
test to differentiate between policy statements and substantive 
rules.254 Further complicating such an analysis is the fact that most 
precedent lumps policy statements and interpretive rules together, 
despite their vast differences.255 What is clear is that the fact that a 
regulation impacts private interests, such as ivory owners’ rights to 
import antiques, is not enough to indicate that the FWS was invoking 
its legislative authority.256  
Some lawyers argue that under the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Heckler v. Chaney, the Director’s Order is a statement of the FWS’ 
decision to not enforce the moratorium to the fullest extent 
                                                            
253. See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Family 
Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n Inc., 979 F.2d 227, 237 (1992) (“A legislative rule . . . ‘is 
one that does more than . . . confirm a regulatory requirement[] or maintain a consistent 
agency policy.’ A rule is legislative if it supplants a statute, adopts a new position inconsistent 
with existing regulations, or otherwise a substantive change in exiting law or policy.”)); see 
also Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (defining substantive rules as rules “issued by an 
agency pursuant to a statutory authority and which implement the statute”).   
254. Compare Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (noting that the fulfillment of any of 
the following factors signals a substantive rule: (1) without the new rule, would there be “an 
adequate legislative basis” to enforce the same duty the rule creates; (2) is the rule published in 
the code of federal regulations; (3) did the agency “explicitly invoke its general legislative 
authority;” and (4) did the rules amend a prior substantive rule?), with General Elec. Co. v. 
E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 382–83 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 
F. 3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Molycorp, Inc. v. E.P.A., 197 F.3d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 
McLouth Steel Prods., 838 F.2d at 1321) (holding that while Molycorp offers a three-part test 
that analyzes (1) how the agency characterizes “its action; (2) whether the action was 
published in the Federal Register or in the Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether the 
actions has binding effects on private parties or on the agency," under Appalachian Power and 
McLouth, a rule will be considered substantive if it appears binding on its face or it is binding 
as applied by the agency). See also Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of 
Deference Accorded Them Offer Insight Into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1303, 
1310–14 (explaining the “Legal Effects” Test; the “Substantial Impact” Test; and the “Impact 
on Agencies” Test).  
255. See Syncor Intern. Corp., 127 F.3d at 94 (citing Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 
F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (“[C]ourts and litigants [tend] to lump interpretive rules and 
policy statements together in contrast to substantive rules . . . . Th[is] causes added confusion 
because interpretive rules and policy rules and policy statements are quite different agency 
instruments.”).  
256. See Central Texas Telephone Co-Op., Inc. v. F.C.C., 402 F. 3d 205, 214 (2005) 
(citing Am. Hospital Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Cabais v. Egger, 
690 F.2d 234, 237–38 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (holding that both legislative rules and statements of 
policy may “vitally affect private interests”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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possible.257 In Heckler, an agency’s “decision not to prosecute or 
enforce . . . is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 
discretion.”258 In fact, under one interpretation of the special rule for 
antiques, this argument seems plausible.259 The special rule provides 
that antiques “may be imported only if,” while, within the same 
subsection, the rule states that sport-hunted trophies “may be 
imported . . . provided.”260 This difference in language could suggest 
that the first are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for import; 
thereby permitting FWS to apply the antiques exception only to non-
commercial imports.261    
In analyzing the broader context of the special rule for antiques, 
there is some evidence that the Director’s Order is more than the 
agency merely exercising its discretion within what is permissible. 
For example, the ESA antique exception prohibiting the regulation of 
“any article which . . . is not less than 100 years of age” was read into 
the AECA, as was noted by the FWS when it promulgated the special 
rule for antiques.262 This is also evidenced by the fact that, 
                                                            
257. See Daniel T. Shedd & Todd Garvey, A Primer on the Reviewability of Agency 
Delay and Enforcement Discretion, CRS REPORT, 4 (Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. 
at 832) (arguing that this statement is applicable to the Director’s Order). 
258. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (expounding on the Heckler argument). 
The judicial deference in Heckler signals the Court’s acknowledgement that agencies have 
discretion in how they allocate their limited resources. See Harold H. Bruff, Availability of 
Judicial Review, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 1, 
15 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (explaining that Justice Rehnquist's opinion for 
the Court in Heckler generally permits agencies “absolute discretion” regarding whether to 
initiate enforcement actions).  
259. See notes 152–54 supra and accompanying text (recounting the creation of the 
antiques exception codified in the CFR).  
260. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(ii)(A) (codifying the antiques exception), with 50 
C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(iii) (permitting sport-hunted trophies to be imported if certain requirements 
are met).  
261. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (holding that “only if” 
language is interpreted as a necessary but not a sufficient condition); In re Application of the 
United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Recs. to 
Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twp. of Tinicum v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
582 F.3d 482 (3d Cir. 2009)) (“while a ‘necessary condition describes a prerequisite . . . [a] 
sufficient condition is a guarantee.’”). But see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW 154–55 (2012) (noting the confusion that the proviso “provided” has caused in 
interpreting statutes because of the “regular abuse” of its use).  
262. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(h)(1) (codifying the ESA antique exception); Endanger and 
Threatened Wildlife; Proposed Endangered Status for Certain Populations of the African 
Elephant and Revision of Special Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,392, 11,393 (Mar. 18, 1991) (“The 
Service . . . impos[ed] a moratorium on ivory imports . . . . This action halted import of all 
ivory products, except sport-hunted trophies under certain conditions, and antique ivory more 
than 100 years old, into the United States.”).   
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historically, the FWS never enforced a complete moratorium on the 
imports of commercial antique ivory.263  
Finally, while not determinative, FWS officials had more 
discretion in the past, whereas officials must now “strictly implement 
and enforce the . . . moratorium on the importation of raw and worked 
African elephant ivory while, as a matter of law enforcement 
discretion, allowing importation of certain parts and products . . . .” 
that are enumerated in the Director’s Order.264 As held in Broadgate, 
Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, one of the clues to 
differentiate between policy statements and substantive rules, “is the 
agency’s use of permissive, rather than binding, language.”265 The 
FWS employees arguably have no discretion in regards to commercial 
antiques or noncommercial items not enumerated in the Director’s 
Order.266 Therefore, the Director’s Order may be more than a policy 
statement.267 Acknowledging the criticisms and potential legal claims 
against the FWS for not creating the Director's Order pursuant to 
Notice and Comment, FWS Director Ashe stated that “though th[e] 
Order was issued as a policy action, we intend to incorporate 
provisions in the Order into our regulations through a public rule-
making process, with opportunity for public comment.”268 As of July 
1, 2015, the FWS has yet to issue a proposed rule for Notice and 
Comment.269  
                                                            
263. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e) (permitting an antiques exception to the moratorium); see 
also FWS, Efforts to Control Illegal Trade, supra note 154, at 2 (stating that commercial and 
non-commercial antique’s may be imported).  
264. Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1. 
265. Broadgate, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 245.  
266. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (noting the language of the Director’s 
Order); see also General Elec. Co., 270 F.3d at 297 (“[A]n agency pronouncement will be 
considered binding as a practical matter if it either appears binding on its face . . . or is applied 
by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.”).  
267. See sources cite supra note 266; Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023 (holding that 
even when an agency states that a document is “intended solely as guidance” can be held to be 
substantive if “from beginning to end . . . [it] reads like a ukase. It commands, it requires, it 
orders, it dictates.”).  
268. Ashe Testimony May 21, 2014, supra note 9, at 7–8 (explaining the next steps the 
FWS intends to take); see also Letter from Daniel Ashe, Dir., FWS, to Congressman Edward 
Royce, Chairman of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs (May 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2014/06/20/document_gw_02.pdf.  
269. See FWS Moves To Ban, supra note 13 (noting that publication of the proposed rule 
was expected in mid-2015); 1 C.F.R. § 1 (2015) through 50 C.F.R. § 697 (2015) (publishing 
no new regulations regarding ivory). 
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2. Regulatory Takings: Personal Property and the Fifth Amendment  
The Director’s Order and the FWS’ proposed actions under the 
National Strategy also raise constitutional questions under the Fifth 
Amendment.270 Under the takings provision of the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution (the “Takings Clause”), the Federal 
Government cannot seize personal property without just 
compensation.271 There are two types of claims under the Takings 
Clause: an actual and physical taking (better known as eminent 
domain) and a regulatory taking, which is at issue here.272   
While the government may enact regulations that restrict the use 
of property, “if [a] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”273 Regulatory takings are compensable if the level of 
interference amounts to one of two scenarios.274 The first scenario 
involves regulations that restrict the use of property so substantially as 
to amount to a categorical taking, in which the government “denies all 
                                                            
270.  Bandow, Administration Treats Collectors as Criminals, supra note 206 (arguing 
that an ivory trade ban will cause litigation under the takings clause); Washington: Ivory 
Regulation Bill Passes Out of Committee with Amendments, NRA-ILA, https://www.nraila.org/
articles/20150205/washington-ivory-regulation-bill-passes-out-of-committee-with-
amendments (last updated Feb. 5, 2015) (“The bottom line is: any property made from a lawful 
product that was lawfully acquired should not be made illegal to sell; such an action is 
effectively a taking of property without compensation.”).  
271. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment applicable to states 
because state governments cannot “deprive any . . . property without due process of the law.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. There is likely a stronger takings argument to be made against 
specific state governments that eliminated all trade in ivory, including antiques. See e.g., N.Y. 
Envir. Conser. Law § 11-0535-a (McKinney 2014) (banning all sale of ivory and only 
permitting ivory to “change possession” unless it is given to an authorized museum, inherited, 
or sold as part of a musical instrument with proper documentation); see also Ivory Fight Moves 
to the States, MAINE ANTIQUE DIGEST, May 2015, at 10A, for a list of all of the states that 
have enacted, or are in the process of enacting, ivory trade bans as of May 2015.  
272. Eminent domain is when property, usually real property, is acquisitioned by the 
government for public use. See Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 408, 
413 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that governmental acquisition of land for public use amounts to a 
taking and must be compensated, even if the acquisition is only a small strip of land); Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982) (holding governmental 
actions that physically intrude on property, especially when the intrusion reaches a permanent 
level of occupation, must be compensated no matter how minor the intrusion).  
273. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (setting the 
foundation for regulatory takings claims); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 
(1992) (providing the seminal decision on categorical takings).  
274. See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 307, 328 (2007) (explaining the “Lucas ‘Total Taking’ Rule” and the “Penn Central 
‘Partial Regulatory Taking’ Test.”); JAMES A. KUSHNER, 1 SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH 
MGMT. § 3:7 (2d ed. 2014) (analyzing takings jurisprudence).  
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economically beneficial or productive use” of the property.275 The 
second scenario involves a partial taking in which the property retains 
some value.276 Analyzed under a three-factor test defined in Penn 
Central, courts will ask to what extent the regulation economically 
impacts the owner; the extent to which the regulation hinders the 
reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owner; and the 
character of the regulatory action.277 
The actions of the FWS raise a potential regulatory takings 
claim: whether prohibiting the export and intrastate sale of all but 
antique ivory, as well as prohibiting the import of any ivory, 
constitute a regulatory taking of personal property or, for ivory 
dealers, of a business interest?278 While no claims have tested this 
question as of the publication of this article, the facts are extremely 
similar to the 1979 Supreme Court case Andrus v. Allard.279  
One of the first cases decided after Penn Central, Allard 
involves commercial traders in Indian artifacts that contained eagle 
feathers.280 The traders challenged two rules promulgated by the DOI 
                                                            
275. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–16 (holding that when “a regulation declare ‘off-
limits’ all economically productive economically productive or beneficial uses of land . . . 
compensation must be paid to sustain it.”); see also Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 
347 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that where the entire property is not affected by the regulation, 
as prescribed by the “parcel as a whole rule,” a categorical takings claim will fail).   
276. See Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (emphasizing that Lucas claims are 
precluded where some value remains); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019–20) (noting that a 95% diminution in value 
will not withstand a categorical taking claim).  
277. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) 
(finding no partial taking where the use of airspace was restricted and the current use was not 
affected). An investment-backed expectation is how an owner expects to use his property and 
whether those expectations were reasonable based on the regulatory environment in which the 
property interest was acquired. See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1288 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that restricting prepayment of subsidized mortgages for low-income 
housing did not effect a regulatory taking); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (setting the factors to be considered under the investment-backed 
expectations prong of the Penn Central test). A further distinction could be made between 
permanent and temporary takings, in which owners are compensated for a discrete time period 
in which the regulation interfered. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002) (holding that temporary takings are analyzed 
under the Penn Central test).  
278. See Bandow, The Administration’s New Ivory Ban, supra note 225 (calling the ban 
a taking of property); Hilaire, supra note 243 (“[B]an opponents will rest their core points on 
[Fifth Amendment] exhortations.”). 
279. See generally 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (analyzing claims under the APA and Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause).  
280. See id. at 65 (analyzing the regulatory takings claim under Penn Central).  
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that interpreted the Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act to apply to objects that had been acquired prior to the passage of 
these Acts.281 The traders argued that limiting transport of property 
containing eagle feathers violated the Fifth Amendment because their 
property rights, such as the right to sell, were significantly reduced 
without any compensation for the loss.282 The Supreme Court 
reversed the Appellate Court’s decision and found that a taking had 
not occurred.283 The Court, in unanimous decision written by Justice 
Brennan, held that merely depriving the property owner of the 
“opportunity to earn a profit from those relics” was insufficient to 
amount to a regulatory taking.284 The Court stated:  
[T]he denial of one traditional property right does not  always 
amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one strand of the 
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in 
its entirety . . . . It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations 
here prevent the most profitable use of appellees property. Again, 
however, that is not dispositive.285  
This decision seems to leave little room for a takings claim for ivory 
owners and dealers because, like in Allard, the imposition of the 
National Strategy would not impede on an owners right to inherit and 
own artifacts containing ivory.286 Second, unlike Allard, there is no 
proposal for a complete federal ban on all ivory sales.287  
                                                            
281. See id. at 53–54 (providing quotations of the specific regulations considered). The 
regulations stated that bids, especially bald eagles, and their parts acquired prior to the 
enactment of the Migratory Bird Treaty and Eagle Protection Act could be possessed or 
transported without a federal permit, but it was prohibited to import, export, sell, trade, etc. See 
id. (citing 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.2(a), 22.2(a) (1978)).  
282. See id. (providing the facts of the claim).  
283. See id. at 65–66 (rejecting that a regulatory taking had occurred).  
284. See Allard, 444 U.S. at 64 (completing the Penn Central analysis).  
285. Id. at 65–66 (citing United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 642 
(1961); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
130–31; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 413, 413 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ”Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1230–33 (1967)).  
286. Compare Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 54 
(statement of Ashe) (“I would say unequivocally that people who have a family heirloom . . . 
can continue to pass that heirloom. They can own it. They can possess it. They can move it.”), 
with Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 (“[I]t is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and 
transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds.”). 
287. See FWS Moves To Ban, supra note 13 (explaining that interstate sales will be 
allowed if the object has an ESA permit and is an antique; and intrastate sales will be 
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In general, takings claims are difficult and are often 
unsuccessful, especially when the regulation does not involve a 
“physical property restriction.”288 While the Supreme Court has not 
directly ruled that personal property cannot be the subject of a takings 
claim, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Rehnquist, 
in a dissenting opinion, differentiated between land and personal 
property.289 He argued that States have broad discretion to regulate 
commercial dealings and that regulations that render personal 
property “economically worthless” are not compensable takings.290 
After the Court's decision in Lucas, many courts held that personal 
property is not compensable under the Takings Clause.291  
Eight years after Allard was decided, however, Justice Scalia, in 
a concurring opinion, wrote that Allard was limited to its facts.292 
Additionally, in 2003, the Federal Circuit held that “[r]eal property, 
tangible property, and intangible property all may be the subject of 
takings claims.”293 In response to the National Strategy, some scholars 
                                                                                                                                     
permitted if it was lawfully imported prior to 1990). In practice, however, some argue the 
“nominal right to sell” is just an attempt to “thwart” Fifth Amendment claims and that the 
heightened and expensive requirements for proving that the ivory falls under one of the 
exceptions will effectively cause a complete ban. See The Administration’s New Ivory Ban, 
supra note 225 (arguing vehemently against the FWS’ plans to restrict property rights of ivory 
owners).  
288. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 (describing when the government must compensate for a 
taking); Robert Meltz, supra note 274, at 311 (explaining why takings claims are difficult to 
win).  
289. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting), as discussed in Bridget 
C.E. Dooling, Take It Past the Limit: Regulatory Takings of Personal Property, 16 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 445, 446 (2007) (arguing that the Court should find a cognizable claim for takings of 
personal property).   
290. See sources cited supra note 289 (discussing personal property takings claims).  
291. See, e.g., United States v. Kornwolf, 276 F.3d 1014, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that seizure of a headdress by an undercover law enforcement after transferring US 
$5,000 to the defendant was sufficient compensation and no taking had occurred); Holliday 
Amusement Co. of Charleston v. S. Carolina, 493 F.3d 404, 410–11 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that regulation prohibiting video poker gaming machines did not constitute a regulatory 
taking).  
292. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 719 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see id. at 
718 (Brennen, J., concurring) (finding nothing “that would limit [Allard]”). See also Vicki 
Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and 
the Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
30, 143 n.163 (2003) (describing takings jurisprudence). 
293. Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no taking 
of eight single hull tank barges, but remanded for further proceedings on seven other barges). 
The court, however, found no taking occurred in that particular case. See id; see also Philip 
Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2002) (leaving open the possibility for a cause 
of action under the Takings Clause for personal property).  
2015] THE (INTER)NATIONAL STRATEGY 1561 
argue that because so many different groups, including art and antique 
dealers, gun owners, and musicians, would be affected by the ban, the 
ban “may force the Supreme Court to reconsider” their position in 
Allard.294 Before June 2015, several scholars argued that Justice 
Rehnquist and the lower courts’ distinction between real and personal 
property was unjustified.295 At least at one meeting during the drafting 
process of the Director's Order, the FWS considered whether the 
substance of the Director’s Order had Fifth Amendment implications; 
but noted that Allard set precedent giving the DOI broad regulatory 
power.296 
In June 2015, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution provides a cognizable claim for takings of personal 
property.297 Based on New Deal Era initiatives, Horne v. Department 
of Agriculture presented the question of whether the government’s 
requirement that a “reserve pool” of raisins be set aside every year is 
a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.298 Horne differs, however, from any potential claims 
challenging the Director's Order in that Horne was based on a 
physical taking, while the Director's Order would likely be argued as 
a regulatory taking.299 Specifically, the court differentiated between 
                                                            
294. Administration Treats Collectors as Criminals, supra note 206 (discussing potential 
taking claims against the government). See also Treasured to Death, supra note 42, at 6 
(acknowledging takings arguments).  
295. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for 
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, passim (2004) (arguing 
that there is no difference between real property and personal property in regards to takings 
claims); Dooling, supra note 289, at 447 (challenging the distinction between real and personal 
property).  
296. See Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking Meeting, FWS, 4–5 (Dec. 16, 2013) 
available at http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/12-16-13-acwt-meeting-summary2.pdf 
(providing the minutes for the Advisory Counsel meeting).  
297. Horne v. Dep't of Agrc., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015) (“Nothing in the text or 
history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it 
comes to appropriation of personal property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay 
just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”).  
298. For a complete analysis of the facts, See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: 
Regulation or Confiscation?, SCOTUSblog, Apr. 21, 2015, http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/
04/argument-preview-regulation-or-confiscation/ [hereinafter Argument Preview] (stating the 
facts of Horne); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014 ), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Sept. 8, 2014) (No. 14-275) at p. 56 (providing the background information on 
regulatory environment).  
299. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d at 1128, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 8, 
2014) (No. 14-275) at p. 20–29 (distinguishing between a claim for per se taking and 
regulatory taking for personal property); Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings 
One Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (Mar. 1, 2012) (“In the case of a 
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the situation in Allard, a regulatory taking, and the claim in Horne, a 
physical taking.300 That being said, the holding in Horne makes clear 
that personal property is protected under the Takings Clause, which 
may pave the way for future claims for a regulatory taking of personal 
property under the Lucas and Penn Central tests.301  
Finally, antique ivory dealers may have a cognizable claim for a 
taking of their business interest if the National Strategy is 
implemented.302 For example, using an analysis under the first prong 
of the Penn Central three-prong test, the Court in Kimble Laundry 
Co. v. United States recognized the loss of the going-concern value 
and good will as sufficient to show severe economic impact.303 The 
Court found that if a business owner’s patronage is lost or 
appropriated as a direct result of the regulation, the economic impact 
                                                                                                                                     
per se physical taking, the government must pay . . . full compensation for the value…. 
Regulatory takings, in contrast, leave []owners in possession, but subject them to restrictions 
on the ability to use, develop, or dispose of the [property] . . . . [R]egulatory takings are only 
compensable when the government cannot show some social justification, broadly conceived, 
for its imposition.”) Although, because ivory sold not in compliance with any new regulations 
would be subject to forfeiture, there may be an opportunity to argue that the regulations affect 
a per se taking. But see Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (denying a cognizable 
takings claim for forfeiture). 
300. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2429 (2015) (differentiating between Allard and Horne).  
301. See Epstein, supra note 300, at 105 (“There is no intellectual warrant for making 
the categorical distinction between physical and regulatory takings, so that distinction should 
be abolished.”); Dooling, supra note 289, at 446 (“A regulation . . . that makes personal 
property ‘economically worthless’ is not a loss of value that is compensable under the Takings 
Clause.”) (emphasis in original).  
302. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) 
(compensating lost good will and earning power due to a temporary taking of business); 
Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 440, 444 (2005) (“Huntleigh USA I”) 
(denying motion to dismiss and holding that the Plaintiff had a cognizable claim for a 
government taking of business assets); United States v. 0.88 Acres of Land, 670 F. Supp. 210, 
213 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (Compensating landowners “for the loss of the[ir] business as whole, 
including any good will and going-concern value.”).  
303. See generally Kimball Laundry Co., 338 U.S. at 11; see also Huntleigh USA Corp. 
v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Huntleigh USA II”) (quoting BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 715 (8th ed. 2004)) (explaining that goodwill is defined as “[a] business's 
reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the 
business.”). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The value of a commercial 
enterprise’s assets or of the enterprise itself as an active business with future earning power, as 
opposed to the liquidation value of the business or of its assets.”); Kimball Laundry Co.., 338 
U.S. at 9 (1949) (defining going concern value as the capacity of a business of greater skill and 
“more effective solicitation of patronage than are commonly given to such a combination of 
land, plant, and equipment.”). Going concern value is partially determined by identifying the 
good will and “earning power” of an effective business organization. See id. at 11. But see 
Huntleigh USA II, 525 F.3d at 1382 n.3 (citation omitted) (holding that going concern value is 
compensable only in temporary takings).  
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prong favors the owner.304 Based on this theory, antique ivory dealers 
could have a cognizable claim based on the loss of patronage, earning 
power, and reputation.305 Courts, however, have been reluctant to find 
a taking for lost business interest, no matter how severe the taking, 
because it is difficult to calculate such a loss.306 Further, the economic 
factor of Penn Central must be balanced against the character of the 
regulation.307 Here, the government would likely argue that because 
the illegal ivory trade funds poaching, which in turn funds terrorism, 
the government is preventing a public harm, not merely providing a 
public benefit.308 To date, takings claims have been unsuccessfully 
brought under the ESA and none have been brought under the 
AECA.309  
In summary, the Director’s Order clearly raises procedural and 
constitutional questions. Given current regulatory takings 
jurisprudence under Allard, a takings claim is not likely to succeed 
unless courts are willing to extend the Takings Clause to regulatory 
takings of personal property and not just merely per se takings of 
personal property, as held in Horne. Similarly, under the APA, there 
                                                            
304. See Kimball Laundry Co., 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (finding no taking had occurred in 
a claim against the government for the temporary occupancy of laundry and dry cleaning 
service for the Army).  
305. See id.  
306. See, e.g., Huntleigh USA II, 525 F.3d at 1375 (holding no taking had occurred for 
“frustrating” the business contracts with airlines); Kafka v. Montana Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & 
Parks, 348 Mont. 80, 104 (2008) (holding intangible assets were not compensable property 
interests); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors 
in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 292 (1991) (“Business losses . . . 
because of their intangible nature, pose much more difficult issues. Although these losses arise 
directly out of a physical taking, they themselves are nonphysical in nature, and hence are 
considered noncompensable in most jurisdictions.”). 
307. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388 (1988) (explaining that 
the character prong asks whether the government is attempting to prevent a public harm or 
merely conferring a benefit); Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 517–18 (2009) 
(holding that three inquiries must be made: “the degree of harm created by the [owner’s] 
prohibited activity, its social value and location, and the ease with which any harm stemming 
from it could be prevented”).  
308. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010 (finding that the preservation of wetlands to be 
conferring a public benefit rather than preventing a public harm); Maritrans, 342 F.3d at 
1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The purpose of the Just Compensation Clause is . . . to discourage 
the government from requiring a few select individuals to bear the burdens of [a] public 
benefit.”).  
309. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 896 F. Supp. 1057, 1062–63 (D. Colo. 1995) 
(holding that enforcement of the ESA does not effect a taking); Conti v. U.S., 291 F.3d 1334, 
1335–36 (2003) (finding that a ban on gillnet fishing did not constitute a regulatory taking). 
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may be a cognizable claim for failing to follow proper procedures in 
rulemaking.  
B. Criticisms and Practical Challenges Caused by the FWS’ 
Actions  
The National Strategy is meant to close “loopholes” that have 
provided a cover for illegal trade.310 In addition, the Director’s Order 
creates a bright line rule thus shifting the burden of proof from the 
government to property owners.311 The policy of the US Government 
to impose a trade ban and encourage other countries to follow suit, 
however, is criticized by museums, antique dealers, and other 
interested parties.312 These constituents argue that the legal ivory 
trade should not be punished because of the illegal trade.313  
1. Bright Line Rules: Making Enforcement Easier While 
Limiting Ivory Owners’ Bundle of Rights  
The government contends that the practical effect of the National 
Strategy, particularly under the Director’s Order, is the creation of 
bright line rules.314 First, under United States v. Grigsby, the 
government has the burden to prove that an individual bringing in 
black market ivory knew it was illegal and the individual had the 
specific intent to break the law.315 The Director’s Order, however, 
now shifts that burden to the owner because importing ivory for 
                                                            
310. See supra notes 191–92 (discussing the purpose of the ban).  
311. See infra notes 314–16 (explaining how the Director’s Order shifts the burden of 
proof to the owner). 
312. See infra notes 319–24 (discussing collectors’ arguments against the National 
Strategy); see also discussion infra Part II.B.2 (exploring business owners and museums’ 
sentiments about the National Strategy).  
313. See infra Part II.B.1–2, for a complete discussion of the opposition to the National 
Strategy.  
314. See Director’s Order No. 210, Amendment 1 (requiring the person claiming the 
benefit of import, export, or sale to bear the burden of proof); see also FWS Moves To Ban, 
supra note 13 (“[T]hese administrative actions, if finalized, [will shift] the burden of proof . . . 
upon the person claiming the exception. Importers, exporters, and sellers should be prepared to 
provide documentation that exempts them from the prohibitions . . . .”).  
315. See United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 819 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n the final 
version of the [AECA], the adverb ‘knowingly’ modifies the verb ‘violates’ and connotes 
deliberate, cognitive or specific intent as a requirement for criminal violation of [the 
AECA].”); see also Allgood et al., U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 43 (criticizing the 
Grigsby standard).  
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commercial purposes is now per se prohibited.316 Second, the 
government claims that these rules will make it easier for law 
enforcement, because it is difficult for FWS agents to tell that ivory is 
indeed antique.317 
Reflecting on the effect of the Director’s Order, Marcus Asner, 
member of the Advisory Council to the Presidential Task Force on 
Wildlife Trafficking, notes:  
The advantage of the Director’s Order is that it creates a bright 
line rule. The approach simplifies things for the enforcement 
authorities, and makes it relatively easy for individuals and 
[stakeholders] to figure out how to comply with the rules. The 
disadvantage of having a simple, bright line rule, of course, is 
that it can cast too wide a net. Here, the Director’s Order sweeps 
in people and groups that otherwise would have legitimate uses 
for antique ivory, such as . . . antique art collectors.318 
The Director’s Order and the National Strategy, once fully 
implemented, will limit the “bundle of rights” of antique and ivory 
owners.319 As a result, some collectors argue their valuable art will be 
“worthless and uninsurable.”320 The items affected by the National 
Strategy include, but are not limited to, “clarinets, canes, pistols, 
                                                            
316. See Elliott, McCartin, Brugato, & Lis, supra note 151, at 3 (citing Director’s Order 
No. 210, Amendment 1 (noting that the Director’s Order places the burden of proof on the 
“importer, exporter, or seller.”)); Christy, U.S. Tightens the Noose, supra note 2 (maintaining 
that smugglers have benefited from the Grigsby standard).  
317. See Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 54 (statement 
of Ashe) (answering questions from Congresswoman Karren Bass). But see Nuke Test 
Radiation Can Fight Poachers: Age and Legality of Ivory Revealed by Carbon-14 Dating, 
UNIV. MICH. NEWS, http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/21563-nuke-test-radiation-can-fight-
poachers-age-and-legality-of-ivory-revealed-by-carbon-14-dating (last updated July 1, 2013) 
(last visited Aug. 24, 15) (explaining that ivory can be dated since the year the atomic bomb 
was dropped using carbon testing).  
318. Email from Marcus Asner, member, Advisory Council to the Presidential Task 
Force on Wildlife Trafficking, and Partner, Arnold & Porter, LLP, to author (Feb. 18, 2015 
15:55 EST) (on file with author) (discussing the new ivory policies). 
319. See supra note 201–05 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that the ivory 
trade will be limited under the National Strategy); see also John Leydon, Op-Ed., Grandma’s 
Cameo Becomes Yard-Sale Contraband: How Will a Government Ban on Selling or Trading 
Antique Ivory Help Save the Endangered Elephants?, WALL ST. J., Jun. 23, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/john-leydon-grandmas-cameo-becomes-yard-sale-contraband-
1403563976 (“You own it, you’re stuck with it.”).   
320. Leydon, supra note 320 (contending that the “government is overreaching”); see 
also Brook Mason, Save the Elephants! Antiques Mkt Hit by Federal Ban on Ivory Sales, 
OBSERVER, Oct. 15, 2014, http://observer.com/2014/10/antiques-mkt-shaken-by-federal-ban-
on-ivory-sales/ (discussing a conference hosted in October 2014 by Herrick, Feinstein LLP & 
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts on the ivory ban).  
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crucifixes, timepieces, chess sets, cameos, guitars, mahjong sets, 
pianos[,] [and] furniture.”321 Musicians are also affected; any time a 
musician wishes to import an instrument containing ivory, they must 
prove that the instrument is over 100 years old in order to perform in 
the United States.322 Even collectors who have ivory that fit into the 
criteria for export or interstate sale will have difficulty proving 
legitimacy because the requisite documentation is a recent 
requirement.323 Finally, some collectors feel that the National Strategy 
creates an aura of immorality around owning any ivory, regardless of 
its age, and are upset that “their collections have been likened to 
blood diamonds.”324   
The days after the release of the Director’s Order, Congressman 
Matthew Salmon, a supporter of limiting the ivory trade, questioned 
Director Ashe about the impact the ban would have on owners and 
was “particularly concerned about families that might have a family 
heirloom . . . which has been passed down from generation to 
generation with little regard of paperwork . . . .”325 Mr. Ashe 
responded, “[I]f it is a family heirloom it strikes me that the value is 
in the generational value of the product.”326 The effect of the 
proposed plan on collectors is viewed as an unfortunate consequence 
of a necessary measure.327 Some believe that while change is difficult 
                                                            
321. Leydon, supra note 320 (projecting the impracticality of enforcing such a ban); see 
also Bandow, Punishing Ivory Owners, supra note 40 (listing additional objects that will be 
affected).  
322. See Mason, supra note 321 (quoting David Freundenthal, Director, Government 
Relations, Carnegie Hall) (“Musicians from abroad have to document that their instruments 
over 100 years old just to come and perform here.”); Blumenkehl, supra note 215, at 11 
(noting the requirements musicians will need to meet).  
323. See Mashberg, supra note 5, at A15 (hypothesizing that few owners have the 
required documents); Elliott, McCartin, Brugato, & Lis, supra note 151, at 3 (noting that 
because the documentation is relatively new, owners would “run afoul” with the new 
requirements).  
324. Harris, supra note 60 (writing from the perspective of an ivory collector); see also 
U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 72 (calling for a complete ban in the ivory trade because “it 
carries a certain moral weight, indicating that the ‘social license’ for ivory has been revoked”).  
325. See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 54 
(statement of Matthew Salmon, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs). 
326. See id. (statement of Ashe).  
327. See Treasured to Death, supra note 42, at 6 (supporting the National Strategy); see 
also IFAW, Video: Actress Kristin Bauer Throws Personal Ivory Trinkets On Crush Pile in 
Denver, Nov. 18, 2013, http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/news/video-actress-kristin-bauer-
throws-personal-ivory-trinkets-crush-pile-denver (highlighting that during the ivory crush in 
Denver, actress Kristin Bauer threw in her mother’s ivory bracelet brought back from Japan 
after World War II and stated “this heirloom is just a thing.”).  
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and the ban would levy a burden on individual owners, the change 
must happen.328 As one FWS agent said, “No guts, no glory—and no 
elephants.”329  
2.  Industry Halts: Challenges for Antique Business and Museums 
Like collectors, antique dealers, auction houses, and museums 
are also affected by the Director’s Order and National Strategy.330 In 
fact, entire businesses may not survive if the National Strategy is 
carried out and its content becomes law.331 While those in favor of the 
ban acknowledge the potential effect of implementing the National 
Strategy on businesses and owners, the ultimate focus is on stopping 
ivory trafficking and not on those that will bear the burden of any new 
regulations.332   
Art dealers respond by pointing out the hypocrisy in a regulatory 
regime that allows imports of sport-hunted trophies, but not 
antiques.333 Scott Defrin, a European decorative arts dealer and 
former specialist in nineteenth century works of art at Sotheby’s, 
                                                            
328. See Peter LaFontaine, What Does the New US Ivory Ban Mean for Buyers, Sellers, 
and Elephants?, IFAW, Mar. 3, 2014, http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/news/what-does-new-
us-ivory-ban-mean-buyers-sellers-and-elephants (praising the proposed rule and sarcastically 
noting that “if you’re planning to wear [ivory], sell it, or show it off to your neighbors, it won’t 
make it past the border”). 
329. See Treasured to Death, supra note 42, at 6 (quoting another source) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
330. See St. Hilaire, supra note 243 (“Personal property issues likely to arise as a result 
of the moratorium on pre-existing elephant ivory goods include potential problems for 
individuals, businesses, and museums.”); Letter from Marcus Asner to author, supra note 319 
(noting that auction houses and museums are equally effected by the Director’s Order).  
331. See Mason, supra note 321; Kathleen Caulderwood, Illegal Ivory Trade: US 
Authorities Target American Auction Houses, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2014, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/illegal-ivory-trade-us-authorities-target-american-auction-houses-
1656750 (“Auction houses and dealers argued the new ban was unfair and could seriously 
harm their business.”); see also Mashberg, supra note 5, at A15 (quoting Craig Hoover, Chief 
of the Wildlife Trade and Conservation branch at the FWS) (acknowledging the impact the 
National Strategy will have various industries).  
332. Treasured to Death, supra note 42, at 6 (quoting another source) (emphasis in 
original) (arguing that the FWS’ job is to promulgate new regulations); see Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 54 (statement of Ashe) (responding to 
questions about different groups that would be affected by the National Strategy by stating: 
“[O]ur priority for law enforcement is syndicated commercial-scale trafficking.”).  
333. Letter from Clinton Howell, President, Art and Antique Dealers League of 
America, & James McConnaughy, President, Nat’l Art and Antique Dealers Assoc. of 
America, to Daniel Ashe, Dir., FWS (Mar. 7, 2014) (“It is unfair to permit freshly-killed 
‘sport-hunted trophies’ while banning certified antiques.”); Alberge, supra note 226 
(discussing various reactions to the National Strategy).  
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remarked, “They’ll allow hunters to bring home trophies from Africa, 
but not antiques!”334 Further, some dealers and critics of the ban 
believe that the National Strategy is baseless and will only increase 
the illegal trade of ivory.335 They argue that enacting a near-complete 
ban on the ivory trade will create an effect similar to Prohibition 
where “merging the illegal and legal markets . . . create[s] greater 
economic incentives for illicit sales.”336 For the ethical dealers, some 
fear the only way to continue their business is to “gouge the ivory 
inlay” from antiques.337  
Museums that are interested primarily in antiques are concerned 
about restrictions on their ability to acquire, exhibit, and loan pieces 
containing ivory.338 For example, as a result of the Director’s Order, 
museums will be unlikely to receive donations from abroad because 
the tax benefit for such charitable donations is commercial in nature 
and, therefore, prohibited.339 Even without this tax incentive, ivory 
                                                            
334. Alberge, supra note 226 (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
335. See Scott Simmons, The Antiques World is Reeling from Federal Restrictions on the 
Sale of Ivory, FLORIDA WEEKLY, Sept. 24, 2014, http://fortmyers.floridaweekly.com/news/
2014-09-24/Top_News/The_antiques_world_is_reeling_from_federal_restric.html (quoting a 
Florida art dealer) (“When you make something completely illegal, you create a larger black 
market, you create a larger demand.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Administration 
Treats Collectors as Criminals, supra note 206 (arguing that an ivory ban will “weaken 
conservation efforts by expanding the ivory black market, diverting enforcement resources 
away from true contraband ivory, and enriching those engaged in the illegal ivory trade”).  
336. Punishing Ivory Owners, supra note 40 (hypothesizing that the National Strategy 
will only increase the illegal trade and, thus, increase poaching); see also Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 65 (statement of the NRA) (claiming that the 
National Strategy will “result in losing a new-gain in African Wildlife Conservation”). 
337. Mashberg, supra note 5, at A15 (quoting Mike Clark, owner of Collectors Firearms 
in Houston). See also Telephone interview with Larry Feinberg, Director, Santa Barbara 
Museum (Aug. 31, 2014) (explaining to the author the repercussions the National Strategy will 
have if realized).  
338. Telephone interview with Larry Feinberg, supra note 337 (answering the author’s 
questions regarding museums’ main concerns about the National Strategy and the Director’s 
Order); Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), [AAMD]’s Presentation, Oversight 
Hearing on “The [FWS’] Plan to Implement a Ban on Commercial Trade in Elephant Ivory,” 
(June 24, 2014), available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=
web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAAahUKEwjvzIHDlIvHAhXJ1R4KHdvBCko&url=https%3A%2
F%2Faamd.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fkey-issue%2FFINALS~1.DOC&ei=I3O-Va-
vHsmre9uDq9AE&usg=AFQjCNGEemV9XYeZ5_aBZNFQkz7FiAe0pQ&sig2=i4umS1Noz8
x2qJ89RIkfjA&bvm=bv.99261572,d.dm, (expressing concern about whether museums would 
be in breach of the Director’s Order for importing donations from abroad).   
339. See sources cited supra note 338 (discussing the response from museums to the 
Director’s Order and National strategy); see also supra note 212 and accompanying text 
(explaining what is permitted to be imported); 50 C.F.R. § 23.5 (2014) (defining commercial 
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removed from the wild pre-1976, but traded abroad after February 14, 
2014, cannot be imported.340 Larry Feinberg, Director of the Santa 
Barbara Museum of Art, notes that while congressional members are 
sympathetic to museums, there is concern about political backlash for 
opposing the ban.341  
C. Will a US Ban Reduce the Illegal Ivory Trade and Poaching?  
Conservationists are split on whether a US ban of ivory sales 
will reduce the demand for ivory and whether that demand will affect 
poaching in Africa.342 Dr. Daniel Stiles, researcher and member of the 
IUCN, and John Frederick Walker, author and reporter on Africa, 
believe that a complete ban is counterintuitive to lowering the demand 
for ivory.343 Dr. Stiles and Walker argue that instead of creating more 
regulations, funds should be poured into enforcement.344 Further, Dr. 
Stiles argues that there are alternatives to a complete ban, such as 
levying a tax on ivory sales.345  
Others, who agree with Dr. Stiles and Walker, argue that the ban 
is not based in science and will not actually have an effect on 
reducing poaching in Africa.346 Several Economist articles maintain 
that trade bans make the situation worse.”347 As some scholars note, 
                                                                                                                                     
to include “transfer, donation, [and] exchange . . . that is reasonably likely to result in 
economic . . . benefit”).  
340. See sources cited supra note 338 (discussing the response from museums to the 
Director’s Order and National strategy). 
341. Telephone interview with Larry Feinberg, supra note 337 (recounting his trip to 
Washington D.C., in the summer of 2014 to advocate on behalf of AAMD).   
342. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (comparing the different views as the 
effect of an ivory trade ban).  
343. See Walker, Case for a Legal Trade, supra note 186 (arguing against the 
implementation of a near-complete ban); Stiles, CITES-Approved, supra note 1, at 152 
(examining the ivory trade).  
344. See sources cited supra note 343 (listing the conservationists in opposition to the 
ivory ban).  
345. See Stiles, CITES-Approved, supra note 1, at 152 (presenting alternatives to a 
complete ban); Stiles, Ivory Trade Ban, supra note 18 (laying out several approaches to reduce 
demand for ivory and the illegal ivory trade).  
346. See sources cited supra note 336 (providing some of the dissent to the National 
Strategy).  
347. Use Them or Lose Them, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.economist.com/
node/10808550 (providing a negative few of the an ivory ban from an economist’s 
perspective); see also N.L., Trade Protection, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2013, http://www.
economist.com/blogs/babbage/2013/03/conservation (“Combine inelastic demand, lack of 
substitutes, scarcity and open access to habitats with a trade ban . . . and a black market will 
flourish.”).  
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when legal trade is prohibited, the black market increases; whereas a 
legal, well regulated market can effectively control and increase 
populations of animals once in danger of extinction.348  
Other conservationists, such as Mary Rice, the Executive 
Director of the Environmental Investigative Agency, and Beth 
Allgood, US Campaigns Director for the International Foundation 
Fund for Animal Welfare, argue that an inherent immorality is 
attached to selling ivory and that “[a] legal trade in any commodity 
provides a laundering mechanism for illegal goods.”349 Further, pro-
ban scholars argue that if prominent nations like the United States ban 
ivory trade, the United States will be a “trendsetter,” encouraging 
other countries to do the same.350 
D. Foreign Policy: Is a Similar Ban Feasible in China?  
Part of the National Strategy is to work with foreign nations in 
creating and enforcing similar ivory trade bans.351 As a main source 
of demand for ivory and illegal trade, the United States has focused 
much of its efforts on China.352 This Subpart explores the 
                                                            
348. See Diana S. Weber et al., Unexpected and Undesired Conservation Outcomes of 
Wildlife Trade Bans—An Emerging Problem for Stakeholders?, 3 GLOBAL ECOLOGY & 
CONSERVATION 389, 391 (2015) (noting that CITES repopulated the once endangered 
crocodile by creating commercial entities to farm crocodiles and, thus, create a steady supply); 
On the Way Out, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/
03/endangered-species-trade (summarizing both sides of the argument).  
349. See Rice, supra note 226 (reasoning that a total ivory ban is the best way to protect 
the elephants); Allgood et al., U.S. Ivory Trade, supra note 13, at 72–73 (approving of a ban 
on the import of antiques and offering other loopholes should be closed).  
350. See Hayes et al., supra note 108, at 45–46 (providing comments and 
recommendations for the Advisory Counsel on Wildlife Trafficking); Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 27, at 17 (statement of Ashe) (“United States leadership 
is vital.”).  
351. See Exec. Office of the President, supra note 196, at 2 (“Through our diplomacy, 
we will mobilize global support for, and encourage partners to actively participate in, the fight 
against wildlife trafficking . . . . We will build partnerships with governments . . . to address 
this issue to develop and implement innovative and effective approaches to combating wildlife 
trafficking.”).  
352. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing US efforts abroad). The 
United States is also putting pressure on China through other trade initiatives. See Press 
Release, White House, Fact Sheet: APEC Leaders Commit to Protect the Environment (Nov. 
11, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-
apec-leaders-commit-protect-environment (“APEC serves as a valuable forum to pursue 
efforts to combat [wildlife] trade by tackling the demand side of the economic equation, 
shifting consumer purchasing patterns in tandem with bolstering law enforcement 
cooperation.”).  
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complexities of the ivory trade and analyses whether an ivory trade 
ban is possible in China.  
1. Disagreements about the Source of Demand in China Make 
Finding a Solution Challenging    
As discussed in Part I, the Chinese market for ivory is extremely 
complex.353 Conservation consultant Kirsten Conrad recently wrote 
about the ivory market in China, “The concept that there is one 
market for ivory is as nonsensical as there being one population of 
elephants in Africa.”354 In other words, there are many sources that 
drive the demand for ivory in China and, as a result, the illegal ivory 
market. Due partially to the complexity of the market, 
conservationists disagree about the actual state of market demand in 
China, which complicates finding a meaningful solution to the 
problem.355  
For example, some groups like the Environmental Investigation 
Agency and conservationists like Grace Ge Gabriel, Asia Regional 
Director of IFAW, claim that legal ivory is so expensive as a result of 
the government artificially inflating the price that factories seek out 
illegal sources of ivory.356 Dr. Stiles, however, claims that such data is 
“nonsense, fabricated to suit [the] argument” that a total ban is 
necessary.357 Instead, Dr. Stiles and others researchers argue that the 
illegal ivory is actually more expensive than legal ivory because, with 
a shortage of legal ivory, the price of illegal ivory has 
“skyrocketed.”358  
                                                            
353. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (explaining the demand for ivory in 
China).  
354. Kristen Conrad, The Ivory Market in China, 4 SULINEWS (IUCN Mar. 2013) (on 
file with author) (reporting on initial findings from Conrad’s and Brendan Moyle’s 
investigation).  
355. See sources cited supra note 53 (comparing the different analyses of the Chinese 
ivory market).  
356. See Gabriel, supra note 51 (responding to Dr. Stiles’ suggestions for reducing the 
illegal ivory trade); see also Rice, supra note 226 (identifying administrative costs as raising 
the price of legal ivory).  
357. See Daniel Stiles, Comment to Opinion: Elephants are Not Widgets, Post to A Voice 
for Elephants, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://voices.nationalgeo
graphic.com/2014/09/24/opinion-elephants-are-not-widgets/ (responding to Gabriel, supra 
note 51).     
358. See id (citing his own 2009 research and pointing to IFAW’s research from 2012 to 
support the fact that legal ivory prices are lower than illegal prices); Michael’t Sas-Rolfes et 
al., The Complex Policy Issue of Elephant Ivory Stockpile Management, 55 PACHYDERM 62, 
67–68 (Jan.–June 2014) (comparing the black market prices with the legal ivory trade prices).  
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Further, scholars disagree as to what extent the 2008 CITES one-
off sale had on the level of demand in China.359 Some supporters of a 
total ban in China claim that the one-off sale confused consumers, 
directly causing a surge in the illegal trade and poaching.360 
Conversely, some conservationists argue that the 2008 sale had little 
to do with demand, as Japan’s market (the other location where one-
off sales were allowed that same year) was unaffected and demand 
there has been steadily decreasing since the 1990s while China’s 
illegal trade has been a concern since 1996.361 These conservationists 
and scholars argue that the 1989 CITES trade ban is the direct cause 
of the increase in demand.362 Official reports for CITES have not 
found conclusive evidence to support either conclusion with absolute 
certainty.363  
Certain external world economic factors may also have driven 
increased demand, such the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.364 While 
China was not as affected as other countries, it caused many to 
speculate that the Chinese Yuan Renminbi would depreciate like the 
currencies of neighboring countries and, as a result, caused the 
                                                            
359. See supra notes 42, 53 and accompanying text (discussing the debate regarding the 
2008 CITES one-off sales).   
360. See Carl Safina, Op-Ed, Blood Ivory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, http://www.ny
times.com/2013/02/12/opinion/global/blood-ivory.html?_r=0 (discussing the increase in 
poaching in recent years. Safina is the founding president of Blue Ocean Institute at Stony 
Brook University, where he is also co-chairman of the Center for Communicating Science); 
Hayes et al., supra note 108, at passim (making recommendations to lawmakers regarding next 
steps to reduce the illegal trade based on a current market analysis); see also Christina Russo, 
Can Elephants Survive a Legal Ivory Trade? Debate Is Shifting Against It, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 29, 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140829-
elephants-trophy-hunting-poaching-ivory-ban-cities/ (analyzing the debate regarding how to 
best address the illegal ivory trade).  
361. See Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 28 (rejecting the idea that one-off sales were the 
main source of the increased demand); Stiles, Comment, supra note 357 (noting ETIS’ 
findings that China’s black market for ivory is “clearly driven by other factors . . . 
independent[] of the CITES ivory sale event”).   
362. See Ivory Trade Ban, supra note 18 (“With the trade ban in place, the ivory could 
only be obtained from poaching.”).  
363. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing ETIS and MIKE findings 
regarding the 2008 one-off sale); see also Martin, supra note 28, at 17 (finding no “clear link” 
between the one-off sales and the increase of illegal trade).  
364. See Ivory Trade Ban, supra note 18, at tbl. (showing various economic factors that 
may have played into the increase demand for ivory); Wen Hai & Kaifeng Zhong, The Impacts 
of the Asian Economic Crisis on China’s Foreign Trade, CHINA CEN. FOR ECON. RESEARCH, 
PEKING U., 1 (June 1999) (“Since China has similar financial and economic problems as 
many . . . neighbor[ing] countries, many people . . . predicted in 1998 that China would be the 
next victim in the Asian crisis dominos.”).  
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Chinese to save less.365 Further, even well after the Financial Crisis, 
Chinese stock prices continued to fall between 2002 and 2005, 
causing the Chinese to seek investments in commodities.366 The 2008 
recession, which happened to coincide with the 2008 CITES sale, 
further aggravated this.367  
At the same time, China has become the world’s largest 
exporter, causing an increase in demand for raw materials and 
increases in personal income.368 This growth pattern began in the 
1980s, but increased partially due to China becoming a member of the 
World Trade Organization in 2001.369 As a result of the increases in 
personal income, as well as broad money supply, low trust in the 
press (as it is censored), and other economic factors, the Chinese have 
seen “boom-to-bust” cycles of speculative assets.370 A wide variety of 
luxury goods such as salt, mastiff dogs, black Audis, and real estate 
                                                            
365. See Hai & Zhong, supra note 364, at passim (explaining the impact the 1997 
Financial Crisis had on China’s economy); C.H. Kwan, The Yen, the Yuan, and the Asian 
Currency Crisis: Changing Fortune between Japan and China, passim (Asia-Pacific Research 
Ctr., Stanford University, Working Paper, 1998) (explaining why China was not exempt from 
the crisis).   
366. See Jong-Wha Lee & Warwick J. McGibbin, Domestic Investment and External 
Imbalances in East Asia, 172 BROOKINGS INSTITUTE 1, 10, 13 (2006) (discussing the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis); Linyue Li et al., The Effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis on China’s Financial Market and Macroeconomy, 2012 ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH INT’L 1, 2–3 (2012) (showing that the rise in Chinese stocks did not begin until 
2005).  
367. See Li et al., supra note 366, at 3 fig.1 (showing the sharp fall in stock prices in 
2008); Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 28 (“In an economy facing great inflationary pressure, 
when mainstream investments such as real estate and stocks and bonds fail to perform well, art 
investment makes sense.”).  
368. See Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 28 (noting that personal income has increased); 
WTO, World Trade Report 2014: Trade and Development—Recent Trends and the Role of the 
WTO, 24, 42 (2014) [hereinafter World Trade Report 2014], available at https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report14_e.pdf (discussing Chinese exports).  
369. See World Trade Report 2014, supra note 368, at 6, 70 (describing the growth 
China has made since becoming a member of the WTO); Jeffery D. Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, 
Economic Growth After the WTO Membership, J. CHINESE ECON. & BUS. STUDIES, passim 
(2002), available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/China
_CBB03.pdf (analyzing China’s economy since becoming a member of the WTO).  
370. See Tadashi Nakamae, Can the Earth Support Chinese Growth?, INT’L ECONOMY 
11, 12 (2004), available at http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_F04_Nakamae.pdf 
(discussing China’s boom-and-bust steel industry); Adam Wolfe, Great Speculations: Why 
China is So Bubble-Friendly, FORBES, Apr. 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/2011/04/06/
china-bubble-economy-opinions-roubini-economics.html (listing the factors that cause these 
bubbles); see also Andrew Jacobs, Once-Prized Tibetan Mastiffs are Discarded as Fad Ends 
in China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2015, at A1 (discussing the “boom-to-bust luxury landscape”).  
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have been subject to these bubbles.371 Normally in these cycles, the 
booms cause shortages, leading to price inflation, followed by an 
increased supply, leading to deflation.372 The increasingly limited 
supply of ivory may be fueling the trade, as the downward “bust” has 
not occurred.373  
Finally, the demand for increased raw materials has caused the 
Chinese government to become a large investor in African 
economies.374 According to a recent report published in the 
Economist, China has played an important economic and diplomatic 
role in Africa, helping to stave off conflict and enhance local African 
economies through spending, job creation, and increased 
infrastructure.375 As Chinese travel to Africa has increased, so too has 
the illegal trade routes.376 
                                                            
371. See Wolfe, supra note 370 (“China can blow bubbles faster and bigger than just 
about any other country.”); Jacobs, supra note 370, at A1 (reporting that the most expensive 
Mastiff dog sold for US$1.6 million, with the majority selling at one point around US 
$250,000. Today, they are worth less than US$2,000).  
372. See Chow Hwee Kwan & Peter Wilson, Monetary Policy in Singapore and the 
Global Financial Crisis, in CHALLENGES FOR THE SINAPORE ECONOMY AFTER THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 139, 158 (Peter Wilson ed., 2011) (explaining asset bubbles); Nakame, 
supra note 371, at 13, 88 (explaining common trends in boom-and-bust cycles). 
373. See Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 28 (“Ivory, similar to rhino horn . . . are seen to 
offer a fair return on investment.”); John R. Platt, China’s Wealthy Are Banking On Extinction, 
TAKE PART BLOG, Mar. 24, 2015, www.takepart.com/feature/2015/03/24/china-endangered-
species-banking-extinction-poaching-elephants-tigers-rhinos (quoting J.A. MILLS, BLOOD OF 
THE TIGER: A STORY OF CONSPIRACY, GREED, & THE BATTLE TO SAVE A MAGNIFICENT 
SPECIES (1st ed. 2015)) (“People are ‘banking on extinction’—buying products hoping that 
wild species will soon disappear . . . [because] [t]hese items will become priceless if these 
species become extinct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
374. See World Trade Report 2014, supra note 368, at 88 (noting that in 2013 China was 
cited as among the top five investors in Africa); More Than Minerals, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 
2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-
keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdone-more (discussing Chinese investment in 
Africa for raw materials).   
375. More Than Minerals, supra note 374 (reporting on Chinese presence in Africa); 
Howard W. French, Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/opinion/into-africa-chinas-wild-rush.html (analyzing the 
pros and cons of a Chinese influence in Africa).   
376. See Gao & Clark, supra note 47, at 29 (“China’s increasing presence in Africa 
makes access to an ivory supply easier.”); Swanson, supra note 182 (discussing the ties 
between China and Africa in trade); see also Made in China, supra note 161, at 29 (showing 
map of ivory trade flows within and out of Africa).  
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2. The Ivory Ban Debate in China and Other Solutions 
Given the complexities in the market, is an ivory ban the best 
solution or even feasible? As discussed above, many proclaim that a 
ban in China is the only option that will be effective at ending the 
illegal ivory trade.377 Dr. Daniel Stiles, however, argues a ban is not 
the best solution and that if China was given a steady supply of ivory 
(40–50 tons per year), the demand for illegal ivory would decrease, 
driving down the price and causing traffickers to either enter the legal 
trade or go out of business altogether.378 Some criticize these ideas as 
“flawed” and based on “economic theories found in textbooks;” 
several economists agree that, although less popular, Dr. Stiles’ ideas 
are a viable option.379  
Within China, there are mixed opinions about the ivory trade. As 
Yufang Gao, Research Affiliate and graduate of Yale University, 
recently summarized in a report, the dominant sentiment is either 
in favor of trade or is against illegal trade, with an “emerging” 
sentiment that all trade should be banned.380 Mr. Gao states:  
Awareness about ivory trafficking has substantially increased in 
the past two years. The anti-all-trade perspective is gaining 
momentum. However, a ban on domestic ivory trade remains 
elusive. The current social context is not conducive to a trade 
ban[,] which would be a radical departure from existing policy. A 
moratorium may become possible if . . . the pro-trade group is 
convinced that the elephant crisis undermines their 
interests . . . .381  
On February 26, 2015, China did impose a temporary moratorium on 
imports, but it has been criticized as “symbolic” and unlikely to make 
                                                            
377. See Vandegrift, supra note 181, at 134 (arguing that the demand for ivory in China 
is too high for other methods to have an impact needed to stop poaching); Rice, supra note 226 
(proposing that a ban is the least complicated, most effective means of reducing the illegal 
ivory trade).  
378. See Ivory Trade Ban, supra note 18 (presenting his solution and alternative to an 
ivory ban).  
379. See Gabriel, supra note 51 (responding to Ivory Trade Ban, supra note 18); Use 
Them or Lose Them, supra note 347 (discussing alternatives to trade bans).  
380. See Yufang Gao, From Supply to Demand: Diverse Perspectives on the 
International Ivory Trade, MESC (2014) http://environment.yale.edu/tri/fellow/1898/ 
(summarizing his study of Chinese newspapers, magazines, and news websites between 
January 2003 to September 2013).  
381. See id.  
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an impact on the illegal market.382 While some conservationists see 
this move as, at least, a step in the right direction, other 
conservationists say that the Chinese government may use the 
temporary moratorium as “an excuse to say a ban failed to stop 
poaching and then call for the reopening of international trade in 
ivory at the next major CITES conference . . . .”383 Further, this 
temporary ban does not affect domestic trade.384 
Other scholars and economists offer non-legal methods as 
potential solutions and suggest that promoting increased Chinese 
tourism to Africa is a viable option, making elephants more valuable 
alive than dead for their tusks.385 Most agree that directing attention 
toward public opinion is key.386 Recently, for example, CITES 
translated its “Virtual College” into Chinese, making CITES materials 
more accessible to a larger audience.387 Some demonstrations also 
                                                            
382. See One Year Ban in China, supra note 224, at A12 (“[I]nternational conservation 
organizations said the moratorium would do little to slow the surge in poaching . . . .”). But see 
Patrick Bergin, Opinion: China Announces One-Year Ban on Imports of African Ivory 
Carvings, Post to A Voice for Elephants, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 13, 2015, http://voices.
nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/13/opinion-china-announces-one-year-ban-on-imports-of-
african-ivory-carvings/ (“Even if the ivory ban was largely symbolic, symbolism has its place 
too. It can prove an effective tool by way of drawing attention to a problem in desperate need 
of a solution.”). 
383.  One Year Ban in China, supra note 224, at A12 (summarizing general reactions to 
the Chinese import moratorium); see also China Announces First-Ever Ban on Ivory Imports, 
CBS NEWS, Feb. 27, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-announces-ban-on-ivory-
imports-which-have-fueled-poaching-of-elephants/ (“[T]he country [is] finally showing 
leadership on the issue but need[s] to go much further . . . .”).  
384. See One Year Ban in China, supra note 224, at A12 (explaining the legal 
implications of the import moratorium); see also Simon Denyer, China Suspends Ivory 
Carving Imports, But Move Won’t Stop Poaching, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 27, 2015, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-suspends-ivory-carving-imports-but-move-wont-stop-
poaching/2015/02/27/7c8dbe35-9d10-4859-9bed-24f14bb4c9cc_story.html (“But experts said 
that the move . . . failed to address what conservationists were asking for—a ban on Chinese 
domestic trade.”).  
385. See Use Them or Lose Them, supra note 347 (listing alternatives to an ivory ban); 
Jeffrey Gettleman, To Save Wildlife, and Tourism, Kenyans Take Up Arms, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2012, at A6 (suggesting that tourism may be the best route).  
386. See Swanson, supra note 182 (listing five sources that is fueling Chinese demand 
for ivory); Max Fisher, Obama Wants to Curb Africa’s Ivory Trade. Here’s What He’s Up 
Against, WASH. POST, July 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/
2013/07/01/obama-wants-to-curb-africas-ivory-trade-heres-what-hes-up-against/ (listing 
public awareness campaigns as one of the main reasons why US ivory demand declined).  
387. See The CITES Virtual College Now Available in Chinese, CITES, http://
cites.org/eng/vc_cn (last visited July 1, 2015). CITES Virtual College is online courses geared 
toward enforcement officers and customs agents to ensure officials are enforcing obligations 
under CITES. See id.; see also The CITES Virtual College, CITES, https://cites.unia.es/
index.php? (explaining the CITES Virtual College).    
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have been successful, which try to inform the Chinese public about 
poaching and stigmatize the ivory trade.388 Chinese “rule by law” 
government, however, limits freedom of expression and collective 
organizing, making it difficult for local demonstrations.389 Recent 
celebrity initiatives, however, may be able to help ameliorate this 
problem. For example, basketball star Yao Ming participated in a 
documentary shown in China about ivory poaching.390 Prince William 
has also voiced his concern about the illegal trade in China and 
threatened to destroy all of the ivory in Buckingham Palace.391 In 
addition, Hillary and Chelsea Clinton, as part of their work through 
the Clinton Foundation, have campaigned against poaching.392 
Recently, perhaps as a result of these efforts, the Chinese government 
began its own public outreach campaign that is meant to inform the 
public about Chinese import laws and has invested in assisting 
African nations with wildlife protection.393 
                                                            
388. See generally Austin Ramzy, Conservationists Continue to Push to Block Hong 
Kong Ivory Sales, N.Y. TIMES: SINOSPHERE, Nov. 29, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/11/29/conservationists-continue-push-to-block-hong-kong-ivory-sales/ (“Over the 
past year, at least three Hong Kong stores have stopped selling ivory after complaints by local 
conservationists.”); Laurel Neme, In Hong Kong, Kids Take Action to Stop the Illegal Ivory 
Trade, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Apr. 24, 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/
04/140425-hong-kong-ivory-trafficking-elephants-china-world/ (reporting on a campaign 
begun by school children to stop the ivory trade).  
389. Swanson, supra note 182 (listing the suppression of the environmental movement 
as a source of the continuing illegal ivory trade). See also Susan V. Lawrence & Michael F. 
Martin, Understanding China’s Political System, CRS REPORT, 2, 16 (Mar. 20, 2013), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf (explaining that “rule by law,” as 
opposed to the United States’ “rule of law,” refers to the Chinese governments’ general use of 
“law as a tool for governance”).  
390. Swanson, supra note 182. 
391. See Robert Jobson, Prince William Does it His Way, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/prince-william-does-it-his-way-232412; Ian Jonston, Prince 
William Attacks China Over ‘Ignorant Craving’ for Ivory, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 8, 2014, http://
www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/prince-william-attacks-china-over-ignorant-
craving-for-ivory-9909382.html.  
392. See Monica Medina, Op-Ed, The White Gold of Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/opinion/the-white-gold-of-jihad.html?_r=0; see also 
Christine Dell’Amore, Clintons Say to End Ivory Trade Everyone Needs to Act, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 24, 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/140224-
hillary-chelsea-clinton-ivory-elephants-animals-science-trade-africa-rhino/.  
393. Bergin, supra note 382 (“[T]he Chinese SMS text alert system for all Chinese 
citizens traveling to Kenya, reminding them . . . not to buy ivory . . . during their stay.”); 
Malcolm Moore, Ivory Trade: Can China Get Tough on Tusks?, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 13, 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10636306/Ivory-trade-Can-China-get-
tough-on-tusks.html (reporting on all of the different wildlife campaigns in China).  
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In summary, the proposal for a near-complete ivory ban has 
significant legal and policy implications in the United States because 
it was not published for a comment period, affects the property rights 
of owners and businesses, and significantly hinders museums and 
auction houses. Conservationists still disagree about what effect a 
total ban on trade would have on poaching. Conservationists further 
disagree as to whether a ban is feasible in a country like China, where 
ivory is intertwined with their economy and their cultural heritage.  
III. MOVING FORWARD: AMEND THE BAN, BUT DO NOT 
RESCIND IT 
The National Strategy, while well intentioned, must be 
reconsidered. This Part offers some suggestions about how the United 
States and Chinese governments, as well as other interested parties, 
may resolve some of these issues. Ultimately, the FWS should have 
issued the Director’s Order pursuant to Notice and Comment. Moving 
forward, the United States needs to focus its attention on enforcement, 
not creating more laws. Also, while the United States can pressure 
China to create new laws, a cultural change in China is necessary. The 
focus of the US Government should be aiding African nations in 
pursuit of preventing poaching.  
A. The Director’s Order Should be Reconsidered through 
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking  
The FWS should have created the substance of the Director’s 
Order through Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking as prescribed by the 
APA.394 First, the Director’s Order is unlike any policy statement 
previously issued by the FWS, which were purely administrative.395 
Legally, the Director’s Order does not merely implement the 
Moratorium, but restricts rights granted under the ESA antiques 
exception and enforces new obligations never before required.396 If 
                                                            
394. See supra note 243 (citing other scholars who agree with the author’s assertion). 
But see supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text (discussing an argument under Heckler 
that there is no APA issue). 
395. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (showing that previous orders issued by 
the FWS were administrative and mainly only affected the FWS employees).  
396. See supra notes 210–16 and accompanying text (explaining the new requirements 
under the Director’s Order such as forbidding the import of noncommercial ivory that is sold 
after February 25, 2014); see also supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text (arguing that 
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the absence of discussion regarding antiques during the creation of 
AECA by congress is any indication, the moratorium was never 
meant to include antiques, as Congress likely saw the AECA as an 
additional way to protect African elephants and never meant to 
exclude the ESA requirements and exceptions.397 Further, when the 
FWS implemented the Moratorium, they codified exceptions for 
antiques, in which the antiques’ exception of the ESA was read into 
the proposed rule.398 Finally, the definitive language used in the 
Director’s Order appears binding on its face, as it does not give the 
agency employees discretion regarding enforcement.399 While the 
“binding language” is not necessarily determinative, under current 
jurisprudence cited above, the Director’s Order should be considered 
substantive and, therefore, invalid.400  
If the FWS used Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, they could 
have considered and, perhaps, avoided some of the pushback the FWS 
received.401 It is true that the proposed amendments to the antiques 
exception likely will be published in 2015 for a comment period; 
however, as Director Ashe stated, that the contents of the Director’s 
Order would not be reconsidered; the decision to enact a complete 
import ban on commercial ivory has already been made, leaving little 
room for consideration.402 While the Director’s Order and National 
                                                                                                                                     
when the special rule for antiques was codified, the ESA antiques exception restricting 
regulation of “any article” which is an antique was read into the regulation).  
397. See supra notes 146–47 (explaining that that only sport-hunted elephants were 
discussed in both legislative history and the AECA, and both are also silent as to antiques).  
398. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text (reviewing the special rule for 
antiques, codified in the Code of Federal Regulations); see also sources cited supra note 242 
(arguing that congress may well have never intended for a complete moratorium to exist 
without the FWS first consulting congress).   
399. See supra notes 264–66 (showing how the Director’s Order could be considered 
“binding,” which under Broadgate, is considered a substantive rule rather than a policy 
statement).  
400. See supra note 254 (identifying the tests used to differentiate between policy 
statements and substantive rules); see also supra note 258–66 (offering arguments why the 
Director’s Order should be considered substantive).  
401. See, e.g., supra note 338–40 and accompanying text (explaining one of the 
unnecessary results of the Director’s Order affecting museums, which likely could have been 
avoided had the FWS received comments prior to the creation of the rule); see also supra notes 
318 (noting Advisory Council member, Marcus Asner, and Congressman Salmon’s concerns 
regarding the effect of the Director’s Order and National Strategy on individual legal property 
owners).  
402.  See supra note 268 and accompanying text (quoting Daniel Ashe as stating that the 
Director’s Order will be “incorporated” into the revised rule for antiques); see also supra note 
269 (noting that the FWS proposed rule is likely to be issued in mid-2015).  
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Strategy likely are intended to bring the United States’ rules in line 
with the CITES Control of Trade Plan, the FWS should follow 
procedure and allow experts involved in the ivory trade to have a 
voice in the outcome, adding legitimacy to the rule and ensuring the 
best possible outcome is achieved.403  
B. The National Strategy Should be Considered a Fifth 
Amendment Taking  
Until June 2015, takings jurisprudence likely would have lead 
the author to believe that it was unlikely that a court would find the 
National Strategy to constitute a Taking requiring compensation.404 
Lower courts did not recognize a cognizable regulatory takings claim 
for personal property and the Supreme Court had discussed it only in 
dicta.405 The Supreme Court in Horne, however, found that a 
cognizable takings claim for personal property exists under the 
Takings Clause.406 Horne will likely open the door to new takings 
claims for personal property, such as one brought as a result of the 
implementation of the National Strategy.407  
The National Strategy and the facts in Horne do differ, as 
regulatory takings do not affect possession.408 Further, the rights of 
ivory owners could be considered less affected than those affected by 
the regulation in Allard.409 The distinction between a physical taking 
and a regulatory taking, however, should not be considered when the 
value of an object is economically worthless, as was the case in 
                                                            
403. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text (explaining the CITES Control of 
Trade Plan).  
404. See supra notes 284–87 and accompanying text (expounding on the Supreme Court 
ruling in Allard that compensation for a Taking is unavailable for personal property).   
405. See supra notes 289–90, 292 and accompanying text (expounding on Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent in Lucas, as well as Justice Scalia’s and Justice Brennan’s differing 
opinions on whether the Fifth Amendment protects personal property). But see supra note 293 
and accompanying text (noting that some courts that left open the possibility for regulatory 
taking of personal property).  
406. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing Horne).  
407. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (noting that despite the fact that Horne 
is a physical taking, Horne might open the door for new takings jurisprudence). 
408. Compare supra notes 284–85 and accompanying text (quoting Allard as holding 
that forbidding the sale only removes one of strand of a bundle of rights), with supra notes 
298–99 and accompanying text (explaining that Horne involved a physical taking of personal 
property).  
409. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text (describing the differences between 
Allard and a potential takings claim as a result of the National Strategy).  
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Allard and is the case for most ivory under the National Strategy.410 
There is no reason to believe that takings cases will be any less 
difficult to win; however, there is certainly an argument to be made 
that this should effectuate a taking.411  
If a Penn Central analysis is applied to businesses, the economic 
impact to commercial enterprises is undeniably significant.412 The 
investment-back expectations factor of the Penn Central test is less 
likely to favor a potential claimant, as the market for ivory is highly 
regulated.413 Similarly, the character prong may also weigh in the 
government’s favor, as the purpose of the National Strategy is to 
prevent a public harm, especially if demand for ivory and poaching is 
funding terrorism.414 Given the legal environment for takings claims 
for businesses’ good will and going concern value, advocates may do 
better to direct their efforts in convincing the FWS to amend the 
National Strategy and the Director’s Order.415  
C. The Director’s Order and National Strategy Should Be 
Amended  
The Director’s Order and the National Strategy should both be 
amended to avoid harming legitimate businesses.416 When President 
Obama issued the Executive Order, he specifically stated that 
                                                            
410.  See supra note 302 (quoting Professor Richard Epstein’s argument that the 
distinction between regulatory and physical takings should be abolished); see also Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1015-16 (holding that where economical use is destroyed, “compensation must be 
paid.”).  
411. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (explaining that most takings claims are 
unsuccessful); see also supra notes 274, 277, 319 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
Penn Central Test and considering potential takings claims as a result of the National 
Strategy). 
412. See supra notes 330–32, 337 (discussing the damage to antique businesses).  
413. See supra notes 277, 308 (defining the investment-back expectations and character 
prong of the Penn Central test); see also Part 2.D.1 (discussing the legal environment of the 
ivory trade in the United States).  
414. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting the ecological benefits that 
elephants provide); see also supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (explaining how 
poaching has given ivory the name of “blood ivory”). But see supra note 364 and 
accompanying text (presenting Dr. Stiles and Walker’s argument that the National Strategy 
will not actually affect poaching); Res. Invs., 85 Fed. Cl. at 517–18 (considering whether the 
harm could be prevented in an alternative way).  
415. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (noting that courts are often unwilling to 
find a taking for loss of good will and going concern value).  
416. See supra note 318 and accompanying text (quoting Advisory Counsel member, 
Marcus Asner, as noting that “the Director’s Order sweeps in people and groups that otherwise 
would have legitimate uses for antique ivory”).  
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legitimate trade should be allowed to continue.417 The National 
Strategy and Director’s Order currently do not reflect this and, 
instead, have restricted individual owners’ rights.418  
The anti-trade conservationists and scholars argue that there is 
no legitimate trade in ivory, as it is stained with immorality.419 The 
author questions arguments that would find owning or selling of ivory 
from elephants killed long ago immoral; nevertheless, whatever the 
immorality, the purpose of the Director’s Order and the National 
Strategy is to reduce demand for ivory and to reduce poaching.420 
Artwork and other objects containing ivory brought legally into the 
United States prior to the creation of the AECA should have an 
economic value beyond mere possessory value.421 Further, making it 
nearly impossible for owners of antique ivory to sell their ivory 
domestically by requiring paperwork not previously required or 
provided will likely do little to reduce poaching in Africa.422  
As conservationists have shown, some illegal ivory in the United 
States is sold under the guise of the legal ivory trade.423 The answer, 
then, is not more law, but more law enforcement.424 The US $60 
million dollars allocated to implementing the National Strategy 
should be passed on to hiring more FWS agents and improving 
enforcement tactics.425  
                                                            
417. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (quoting the Executive Order). 
418. See supra notes 196–207 and accompanying text (outlining the National Strategy 
and its implementation beginning with the Director’s Order); see also supra notes 330–42 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the policy implications of the Director’s Order and the National 
Strategy in regards to their effect on antiques and arts businesses).  
419. See supra note 381 and accompanying text (discussing conservationists who believe 
in the inherent immorality of owning ivory); see also supra note 349, 324 and accompanying 
text (noting arguments that owning ivory is amoral and likened to owning “blood diamonds”).  
420. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting the four key purposes of the 
Executive Order, one of them being to reduce demand). But see supra notes 40–42 (discussing 
the low demand for illegal ivory in the United States).  
421. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (explaining the effect that the National 
Strategy will have on domestic sales and exports on those who own antiques).  
422. See supra note 46, 376, 380 (explaining that the US ivory market minimally affects 
poaching and that trade bans can increase demand for legal ivory); see also supra 323 and 
accompanying text (showing that few owners likely have the requisite documentation). Cf. 
supra note 381 (arguing that legal trade provides a cover for illegal trade). 
423. See supra notes 49, 51–52 (analyzing the illegal ivory market in the United States). 
424. See supra notes 77, 344 and accompanying text (citing Dr. Stiles and Walker as 
arguing that enforcement should be the priority). But see note 216 (explaining that one of the 
priorities of the executive order is enforcement).  
425. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (noting that US $60 million has been 
allocated to support the national strategy). 
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D. Fully Implementing the National Strategy is Unlikely to 
Decrease Domestic or International Demand for Illegal Ivory  
Pro-ban scholars argue that a legal trade in any commodity can 
provide a cover for an illegal market.426 The National Strategy and the 
Director’s Order, however, are unlikely have a substantial impact on 
reducing the demand for ivory within the United States and may not 
have any effect on reducing international demand.427 The concern that 
the National Strategy, once fully enacted, will create an incentive for 
a large illicit market is real: the United States has seen this with 
Prohibition.428  
E. China: A Total Ban Unlikely Feasible  
The complexities of the market for ivory are not as simple as in 
the United States, where consumers are mostly interested in ivory for 
decorative purposes.429 For the Chinese, ivory provides a means of 
investment in an uncertain market.430 Further, ivory is one of the 
many assets in which the Chinese have invested recently.431 The 
difference other assets in China and ivory, however, is that supply has 
increased in other assets, causing a “boom-and-bust” effect.432  
From a consumer perspective, the supply of ivory is threatened 
by proposed bans.433 Banning the ivory trade likely will continue to 
drive up demand for illegal ivory in China, rather than produce the 
desired “bust” effect that happened to other similar assets.434 Pro-
trade conservations may be right that CITES 2008 sales did, in fact, 
                                                            
426. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (presenting an argument in favor of a 
completely ban).  
427. See supra notes 343, 346–49 and accompanying text (presenting arguments as to 
why a ban on ivory trade will not lower demand, and may even increase it).   
428. See supra note 368–69 (arguing that the national strategy may increase demand for 
illegal ivory). 
429. See supra note 48 (noting that the US market is for antique ivory); see also supra 
notes 71–72, 79–80 (outlining the complexity of the Chinese ivory market). 
430. See supra note 396–98 (discussing the commodities market in China).  
431. See supra notes 371–73 and accompanying text (describing the “boom-to-bust” 
cycles of speculative assets in China).  
432. See supra note 373–75 (noting the difference between previous investment assets).  
433. See supra note 378 and accompanying text (presenting Dr. Stiles’ argument that a 
steady supply of ivory is a better solution to lowering demand).  
434. See supra note 370-73 and accompanying text (discussing bust-and-boom 
economics and offering a reason why the “bust” effect has not occurred).  
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increase demand for ivory.435 The author proposes that this increase in 
demand stems not from the sales themselves, but by the threat that 
there will be no more supply and those imports were the last to enter 
China.436 
Further, given the historical and cultural importance that ivory 
holds, a ban on domestic ivory trade in China is unrealistic at this 
time.437 While no objects can truly replace ivory, promoting other 
sources of stable investments may help to diminish trade.438 Further, 
as more Chinese travel to Africa, tourism coupled with education 
about how ivory is cultivated may help increase the worth of live 
elephants and, therefore, decrease the worth of dead ones.439  
F. The COP Can Do A Better Job to Reduce Poaching 
CITES and the CoP have made great efforts in attempt to save 
the elephants.440 Recent CITES and CoP initiatives, however, have 
failed to bring results.441 This is especially true in regards to the 
DMM, about which members cannot even agree as to its purpose.442 
Even if the DMM were created in CoP17, the process would be only 
in its beginning stages of deciding whether to enact a complete 
moratorium on all trade, even domestically, or whether to have some 
consensus on how a legal trade might work moving forward.443 The 
constant threats of a complete ban or further regulation cause 
                                                            
435. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (providing the pro-ban prospective on 
the 2008 CITES sale).  
436. See supra note 348 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that a steady supply of 
wildlife is actually the way to repopulate endangered species).  
437. See supra note 58–68 (summarizing the history of ivory in China). 
438. See N.L, supra note 347 (predicting that lack of substitutes and scarcity is driving 
the illegal market for ivory); see also supra note 366–68 and accompanying text (showing a 
recent history of undependability in the stock market, causing the Chinese to search for other 
investments).  
439. See supra note 385 and accompanying text (suggesting that making elephants worth 
more alive than dead may be one solution); see also supra note 386 and accompanying text 
(finding that public awareness campaigns may be the best method to fight the illegal trade). 
440. See supra notes 82–110 and accompanying text (summarizing the history of CITES 
and the elephant).  
441. See, e.g. supra note 124 and accompanying text (reporting that trade sanctions have 
not been utilized to enforce compliance with trade regulations); see also supra note 123 
(showing that CITES decisions have been unsuccessful).  
442. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (explaining the failure of the 
DMM).  
443. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (mentioning that DMM is a proposal to 
explore a legal ivory trade).   
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speculation in the market, both in the United States and China.444 The 
CoP needs to come to a consensus, even if it is simply holding 
countries accountable for current laws that are not being enforced. 
Market stability may be the best route to stopping further increases in 
demand for illegal ivory. 
CONCLUSION   
As this Note has distilled, the National Strategy raises several 
policy concerns in the United States and in China.445 The 
implementation of an ivory ban, in particular the Director’s Order, 
also solicits legal questions under the Takings Clause and the APA.446 
The Obama Administration’s motivation for focusing on the illegal 
ivory markets and reducing demand is constructive: poaching in 
Africa must be diminished, if not eradicated. As the President wrote:  
[T]o enhance domestic efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, to 
assist foreign nations in building capacity to combat wildlife 
trafficking, and to assist in combating transnational organized 
crime, executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall take 
all appropriate actions within their authority, including the 
promulgation of rules and regulations and the provision of 
technical and financial assistance, to combat wildlife 
trafficking.447 
It is the author’s opinion that by mainly focusing on creating a ban, 
the FWS has failed in its mission to meet what the Executive Order 
seeks to do. The focus should be on enforcement and providing 
support to FWS agents. The FWS can and should create domestic 
regulations, but without also destroying the rights of legitimate 
owners.  
                                                            
444. See supra notes 359–63 (showing uncertainty about the ivory market and prices). 
445. See supra notes 330–32 (presenting the effects of the proposed plans under the 
National Strategy will have on collectors and businesses); see also supra notes 218–24, 377–
80 and accompanying text (expounding on the National Strategy foreign policy and the debate 
surrounding an ivory ban in China).  
446. See supra notes 243, 246–63 and accompanying text (introducing the potential 
procedural deficiencies of the Director’s Order); see also supra notes 269, 294–96 and 
accompanying text (noting constitutional concerns of the FWS’ proposed action under the 
National Strategy).  
447. Exec. Order No. 13648, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40621. 
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